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GLOBAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
Robert V. Percival* 
Abstract: This Article explores three areas in which globalization is profoundly affecting 
the development of a global environmental law. First, countries increasingly are borrowing 
law and regulatory innovations from one another to respond to common environmental 
problems. Although this is not an entirely new phenomenon, it is occurring at an 
unprecedented pace. Second, lawsuits seeking to hold companies liable for environmental 
harm they have caused outside their home countries are raising new questions concerning the 
appropriate venue for such transnational liability litigation and the standards courts should 
apply for enforcement of foreign judgments. Third, nongovernmental organizations are 
playing an increasingly important role in influencing corporate behavior by promoting 
greater informational disclosure and transparency to mobilize informed consumers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As this symposium confirms, the concept of “global law” has 
sufficiently matured that the term “global law” may no longer need to 
appear in quotation marks. This change reflects the profound effect 
globalization is having on the development of law and legal systems 
throughout the world, particularly in the environmental law field. As 
global environmental law develops, traditional distinctions between 
domestic and international law, and private and public law, are blurring. 
This Article discusses the concept of global environmental law and 
then explores three areas in which globalization is profoundly affecting 
its development: adoption of transnational regulatory norms, 
transnational litigation, and transparency initiatives. Part I briefly 
explains the phrase “global environmental law” and its growing use. Part 
II discusses how countries increasingly borrow law and regulatory 
innovations from one another and adopt their own approaches to respond 
to common environmental problems. Although this is not an entirely 
new phenomenon, it is occurring at an unprecedented pace, at least in 
part because transnational regulatory norms to protect the environment 
are no longer developed primarily in a “top down” manner through 
multilateral consensus agreements. As this Part explains, this 
development is reflected in the outcomes of the 2009 Copenhagen and 
2010 Cancún climate change negotiations that failed to produce a long 
sought-after global agreement to control emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs). The Part also explores the regional movement to create global 
norms to regulate emissions of air pollutants from international maritime 
operations. It then discusses how countries are increasingly learning 
from one another and borrowing regulatory standards. This advancement 
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is illustrated by the global growth of bans on unreasonably dangerous 
products, such as asbestos and gasoline lead additives. As countries learn 
from the experience of others, regulatory innovations with diffuse 
origins are spreading more rapidly around the globe. 
Part III examines the growth of transnational liability litigation as 
another source of emerging global law, as parties seek to hold companies 
liable for environmental harm they have caused outside their home 
countries. These lawsuits are raising new questions concerning the 
appropriate venue for such transnational liability litigation and the 
standards courts should apply for enforcement of foreign judgments. 
This Part focuses primarily on the rapidly metastasizing global litigation 
between residents of the oil-polluted Oriente region of Ecuador and the 
Chevron Corporation. In February 2011, this litigation, which initially 
had been filed in the United States during the early 1990s, ultimately 
produced the largest environmental judgment in history—an $18 billion 
judgment against Chevron issued by a court in Ecuador. This Part also 
examines litigation by workers in Central American banana plantations 
who allegedly were rendered sterile by exposure to Dibromo-3-
Chloropropane (DBCP), a pesticide banned in the United States because 
of its reproductive toxicity, and litigation against the British trading firm, 
Trafigura, for dumping toxic waste on a beach in the Côte d’Ivoire. Each 
of these cases reflects a new global legal landscape where poor plaintiffs 
from developing countries are seeking to hold accountable wealthy and 
powerful corporations that previously would be immune from challenge. 
Part IV reviews emerging quasi-public/quasi-private global 
transparency and disclosure initiatives championed by nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) and private enterprises in collaboration with 
regulatory authorities. This Part explores how NGOs are playing an 
increasingly important role in influencing corporate behavior by 
promoting greater informational disclosure and transparency to mobilize 
informed consumers. These include the Equator Principles governing 
funding of development projects by multinational banks, the Roundtable 
on Sustainable Palm Oil, and the Sustainable Apparel Coalition. These 
initiatives, as well as the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Financial Reform 
legislation’s disclosure provisions concerning conflict minerals and 
payments to foreign governments, are promoting a new corporate ethic 
for assessing the environmental implications of development projects 
and “greening” the supply chains of multinational enterprises. 
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I.  WHAT IS GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW? 
In my previous scholarship I explored the concept of global 
environmental law and the forces contributing to its emergence.1 In this 
work I maintain that global environmental law is a useful concept to 
describe how environmental law is developing throughout the world 
without seeking rigidly to separate the field into domestic and 
international, or public and private environmental law. 
“Global law” and “global environmental law” now have become part 
of the popular lexicon. This assertion is illustrated by Figures I and II 
that display the relative frequency with which these terms appeared in 
English-language books from 1940 to 2008, as revealed through use of 
Google’s Ngram research tool.2 These figures demonstrate that the 
frequency with which both terms were used surged during the 1990s.  
                                                     
1. See generally Robert V. Percival, Liability for Environmental Harm and Emerging Global 
Environmental Law, 25 MD. J. INT’L L. 37 (2010); Robert V. Percival, The Globalization of 
Environmental Law, 26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 451 (2009); Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The 
Emergence of Global Environmental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615 (2009). 
2. This tool enables researchers to determine the frequency with which various terms appear in 
the enormous database of books scanned by Google. Books Ngram Viewer, GOOGLE, 
http://ngrams.googlelabs.com/info (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). 
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FIGURE I. FREQUENCY OF THE APPEARANCE OF THE TERM “GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW” IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE BOOKS FROM 1940 TO 
20083 
 
FIGURE II. FREQUENCY OF THE APPEARANCE OF THE TERM “GLOBAL 
LAW” IN ENGLISH LANGUAGE BOOKS FROM 1940 TO 20084 
 
                                                     
3. Jean-Baptiste Michel, Yuan Kui Shen, Aviva Presser Aiden, Adrian Veres, Matthew K. Gray, 
William Brockman, The Google Books Team, Joseph P. Pickett, Dale Hoiberg, Dan Clancy, Peter 
Norvig, John Orwant, Steven Pinker, Martin A. Nowak & Erez Lieberman Aiden, Google Ngram 
Viewer, GOOGLE, http://ngrams.googlelabs.com (last visited Sept. 19, 2011); see also Jean-Baptiste 
Michel et al., Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books, SCIENCE, Jan. 14, 
2011, at 176. 
4. Michel et al., supra note 3. 
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The use of the term “global environmental law” appears to better 
capture the complex realities of current developments in the 
environmental law field, because traditional disciplinary distinctions 
between domestic and international law, and between private and public 
law, continue to erode, as demonstrated below. Among the factors 
contributing to this phenomenon are the greater connectedness of civil 
society throughout the world,5 growth of international trade and 
multinational corporate enterprises, increased concern for the 
environment throughout the world, and greater global collaboration 
between environmental officials and NGOs. As multinational companies 
push for greater harmonization of regulatory standards, NGOs are 
assisting regulators to improve transboundary enforcement.6 Despite the 
current anti-environmental fervor of the Republican-controlled U.S. 
House of Representatives,7 global concern for the environment has 
surged to a point where a company’s environmental neglect in any 
remote corner of the world is unlikely to pass without notice in its home 
venue. As a result, norms defining acceptable corporate behavior are 
converging, even in jurisdictions that have not formally updated their 
regulatory standards. Whether one believes that globalization or the 
current evolutionary path of legal norms is desirable or undesirable, 
global law is here to stay. 
II.  EMERGING TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATORY NORMS 
The increasing integration of the global economy has given greater 
force to the need for harmonization and coordination of national 
regulatory policies. For example, following the global financial crisis of 
                                                     
5. This central feature of globalization—improvements in communication technology and the rise 
of the internet—was popularized by journalist Thomas L. Friedman in his book THE WORLD IS 
FLAT (2005). 
6. MAKING LAW WORK: ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE & SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 553–54 
(Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 2005), available at 
http://www.inece.org/mlw/Chapter6_NGOComplianceStrategies.pdf. 
7. Paul Quinlan, ‘Anti-Environmental’ House Freshman Leads Charge Against Obama’s Clean 
Water Agenda, N.Y. TIMES GREEN, (May 3, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/03/03greenwire-anti-environmental-house-freshman-leads-
charge-98149.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2011); see also Dina Fine Maron & Saqib Rahim, 
Democrats Mount Rear-Guard Action Against Republican Assault on EPA Climate Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES GREEN (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2011/02/17/17climatewire-
democrats-mount-rear-guard-action-against-re-29952.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2011); Kate 
Sheppard, The Most Anti-Environment Congress Ever?, MOTHER JONES BLUE MARBLE (Sept. 12, 
2011, 12:36 PM), http://motherjones.com/blue-marble/2011/09/most-anti-environment-congress-
ever. 
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2008, particular effort was made to strengthen coordination of global 
economic policy.8 This was achieved in part by broadening the 
representation on the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to 
include representation from each of the members of the G-20 major 
economies of the world.9 In addition, the Basel Committee adopted 
Basel III regulatory standards to govern capital adequacy and liquidity of 
banks.10 The Basel negotiations illustrate a trend that is occurring in 
environmental areas as well—multilateral treaties are being 
deemphasized in favor of informal agreements on coordinated regulatory 
policies.11 
Informal multilateral agreements ultimately contribute to an emerging 
species of global law: transnational norms defining acceptable and 
unacceptable corporate conduct. By 1999, the United Nations listed a 
total of 229 multilateral treaties relating to the environment, a significant 
jump from the forty-seven environmental treaties that existed through 
1970.12 However, many now believe that we have passed the high point 
of global efforts to negotiate multilateral treaties to address the planet’s 
environmental problems.13 To be sure, negotiations continue on some 
important global environmental treaties, including an effort to create a 
legally binding instrument on global mercury emissions.14 However, the 
negotiation of new international treaties no longer seems to be the 
primary focal point of developing global environmental law.15 Replacing 
it is a new paradigm: countries increasingly emphasize bilateral 
negotiations and informal efforts to coordinate regulatory policies and to 
                                                     
8. Press Release, Basel Comm., Initiatives in Response to the Crisis by the Basel Comm. (Mar. 
30, 2009), http://www.bis.org/press/p090330.htm. 
9. Press Release, Basel Comm., Basel Committee Broadens its Membership (June 10, 2009), 
http://www.bis.org/press/p090610.htm. This included adding Argentina, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, 
South Africa, and Turkey as well as Hong Kong SAR and Singapore. Id. 
10. Press Release, Basel Comm., Basel III Rules Text and Results of the Quantitative Impact 
Study Issued by the Basel Committee (Dec. 16, 2010), http://www.bis.org/press/p101216.htm. 
11. See David Doniger, The Copenhagen Accord: A Big Step Forward, SWITCHBOARD (Dec. 21, 
2009), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/ddoniger/the_copenhagen_accord_a_big_st.html 
(suggesting that the formal negotiating process under the UNFCCC has failed).  
12. Environmental Law Instruments, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, 
http://hqweb.unep.org/Law/Law_instruments/index_complete_list.asp (last visited Aug. 28, 2011). 
13. See Robert Falkner et al., International Climate Policy after Copenhagen: Towards a 
‘Building Blocks’ Approach, 1 GLOBAL POL’Y 252, 252 (2010), available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2010.00045.x/full. 
14. See, e.g., Melanie Ashton et al., EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL. (Int’l Inst. for Sustainable 
Dev.) (June 8, 2010), http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb2802e.pdf. 
15. Falkner et al., supra note 13. 
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borrow regulatory innovations from one another.16 As the rest of this 
section demonstrates, this paradigm shift is illustrated by how the 
nations of the world are responding to the problems of (1) climate 
change, (2) air pollution from global maritime operations, and (3) 
unreasonably dangerous substances such as asbestos and gasoline lead 
additives. 
A.  The Search for an Elusive Post-Kyoto Global Response to Climate 
Change 
Beginning with the first United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972, the nations of the world 
convene global “earth summits” at ten-year intervals.17 Interest and 
participation has increased over the years. Although 113 nations 
attended the summit in Stockholm,18 178 nations attended the 1992 Rio 
Earth Summit.19 At the Rio conference, the U.N. Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed,20 setting in motion a process 
designed to culminate in legally binding limits on global emissions of 
GHGs. The U.S. Senate quickly ratified the UNFCCC in October 
1992.21 
Following the success of the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, there was considerable optimism that a 
similar approach could be used successfully to combat climate change.22 
Things started out well. In December 1997, the Kyoto Protocol to the 
UNFCCC was adopted, specifying modest reductions in GHG emissions 
                                                     
16. Id. 
17. The History of Sustainable Development in the United Nations, U.N. CONF. ON SUSTAINABLE 
DEV., http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/index.php?menu=22 (last visited Aug. 28, 2011) (discussing 
Rio Earth Summit of 1992 and Johannesburg Earth Summit of 2002); see also About Rio+20, U.N. 
CONF. ON SUSTAINABLE DEV., http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/index.php?menu=17 (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2011) (discussing the June 2012 Conference on Sustainable Development to take place in 
Brazil).  
18. Stockholm 1972 - Participants, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1519&l=en 
(last visited June 2, 2011). 
19. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), 12 ENCYCLOPÆDIA 
BRITANNICA MICROPÆDIA 149 (15th ed. 2010) (“The Earth Summit was the largest gathering of 
world leaders in history.”). 
20. Id. 
21. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Apr. 14, 
2011), http://epa.gov/climatechange/policy/international_unfccc.html. 
22. C. Boyden Gray, Copenhagen Failure vs. Montreal Success, ATLANTIC COUNCIL NEW 
ATLANTICIST POL’Y & ANALYSIS BLOG (Dec. 9, 2009), 
http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/copenhangen-failure-vs-montreal-success. 
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below a 1990 emissions baseline that developed countries were to 
achieve during the period from 2008 to 2012.23 Action on emissions 
controls for developing countries was deferred out of considerations of 
fairness because these countries had contributed so little to the existing 
buildup of GHGs in the atmosphere.24 
But things soon went wrong. Although it was understood that rapidly 
developing countries like China and India would have to commit to 
controlling their GHG emissions in the future,25 President George W. 
Bush used the failure of the Kyoto Protocol to require China or India to 
reduce their emissions of GHGs as a justification for withdrawing U.S. 
assent to the Kyoto Protocol.26 Shortly after taking office, he also 
repudiated a campaign pledge to support legislation to control emissions 
of carbon dioxide.27 President George W. Bush’s retraction undercut his 
new Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator, Christie 
Todd Whitman, who had just returned from an international conference 
of environmental ministers in Trieste, where she had assured her 
counterparts that the United States would act to control its GHG 
emissions.28 As the expiration date of the Kyoto Protocol’s compliance 
period approaches at the end of 2012, it has proven impossible to reach a 
global consensus on a new treaty to combat climate change. 
This was confirmed at the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP-15) to 
the UNFCCC held in Copenhagen in December 2009. Participants in a 
Conference of the Parties (COP-13) held in Bali in December 2007 
adopted the “Bali Road Map” to establish a timetable for negotiating a 
successor to the Kyoto Protocol.29 This adoption set a timetable for 
completing a new global agreement by the end of 2009.30 However, in 
the months before the Copenhagen Conference in December 2009, it 
                                                     
23. Kyoto Protocol, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php (last visited Aug. 28, 2011). 
24. Id. 
25. See Climate Change: The Big Emitters, BBC NEWS (July 4, 2005), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/3143798.stm (noting the sharp increase in emissions from 
China and India). 
26. See David E. Sanger, Bush Seeks Middle Ground on Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES (June 11, 
2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/11/world/11CND-PREXY.html. 
27. BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHENEY VICE PRESIDENCY 82–85, 88–90 (2008). 
28. Id. Gellman reports that Cheney engineered this stunning policy reversal by carefully 
excluding EPA and the State Department from having any input into the decision and ensuring that 
Bush would sign the confirming document minutes before Whitman and the Secretary of State 
arrived at the White House to protest. 
29. The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_13/items/4049.php (last visited Aug. 28, 2011). 
30. Id. 
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became apparent that a comprehensive global agreement to limit all 
significant sources of GHG emissions would be very difficult to achieve, 
particularly because of continuing disagreements between developed and 
developing nations.31 In early September 2009 the government of India 
released a report projecting that India’s emissions of GHGs could 
quadruple over the next twenty years.32 But, India’s Environment 
Minister Jairam Ramesh emphasized that on a per capita basis India’s 
emissions would remain below the per capita emissions of developed 
countries.33 Five independent studies released by India’s government 
project that the country’s emissions will rise from 1.4 billion tons in 
2008 to between 4 billion and 7.3 billion tons in 2031.34 The country’s 
per capita emissions are forecast to rise to between 2.77 and nearly 5 
tons per capita compared to a global average of 4.22 tons per capita in 
2005.35 At the same time, Chinese economists released a study 
concluding that it would cost China $438 billion annually to reduce the 
country’s GHG emissions in 2030.36 
Further progress has stalled. At the Asian-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) summit in Singapore in November 2009, President 
Obama agreed to a proposal by Lars Løkke Rasmussen, the prime 
minister of Denmark, to postpone seeking a new, legally binding global 
treaty to reduce emissions of GHGs at the Copenhagen climate 
conference.37 The decision reflected the reality that insufficient progress 
has been made in preliminary negotiating sessions to prepare the way for 
a global consensus on a new treaty. Instead, participants in the 
Copenhagen summit agreed they would try to save face by announcing a 
“political agreement” on GHG controls, leaving many difficult issues to 
be resolved in subsequent negotiations.38 Some argued that this delay 
                                                     
31. Tom Zeller Jr., Ahead of Copenhagen Climate Talks, Voices of Hope and Discord, N.Y. 
TIMES GREEN, (Nov. 10, 2009, 4:21 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/11/10/ahead-of-
copenhagen-climate-talks-voices-of-hope-and-discord. 
32. James Lamont et al., India’s Growth Set to Lift Emissions Fourfold, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 3, 
2009, at 3. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Kathrin Hille & Fiona Harvey, China’s High Price for Cuts in Emissions, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 2, 
2009, at 6. 
37. David Adam et al., No Deal, We’re Out of Time, Obama Warns, GUARDIAN, Nov. 16, 2009, 
at 1; see also Jonathan Watts, Copenhagen Climate Summit Hopes Fade as Obama Backs 
Postponement, GUARDIAN (Nov. 15, 2009), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/nov/15/obama-copenhagen-emissions-targets-
climate-change. 
38. Watts, supra note 37. 
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would enable the 192 nations participating in the negotiations to “get it 
right” rather than being pressured into hasty compromises at 
Copenhagen.39 
In the hopes of reigniting progress, leaders of particular countries 
announced their own standards to combat global climate change. For 
example, a week before the Copenhagen Conference, both the United 
States and China revealed what they were willing to do to reduce their 
emissions of GHGs. In line with the Waxman–Markey Bill40 that passed 
the House in June 2009, President Obama announced that the United 
States would promise to reduce its GHG emissions by seventeen percent 
below 2005 levels by 2020.41 He also promised to attend part of the 
Copenhagen Conference while on his way to Sweden to accept the 
Nobel Peace Prize.42 China announced that Premier Wen Jiabao would 
attend the Copenhagen Conference.43 While China did not pledge to 
reduce the absolute level of its GHG emissions, it announced that it 
would seek to reduce the “carbon intensity” of its economy (levels of 
carbon dioxide emissions per unit of gross domestic product) by forty to 
forty-five percent by 2020.44 
Observers viewed both the U.S. and Chinese pledges in glass-half-
empty/glass-half-full terms. They represented progress in the sense that 
for the first time both nations—the two largest emitters of GHGs in the 
world—made serious promises to the international community to start 
controlling their emissions. Yet the pledges were disappointing to many 
environmentalists because they clearly were inadequate to achieve the 
G-20’s previously announced goal of containing global warming to no 
more than two degrees Celsius.45 While the United States had proposed 
                                                     
39. Id. 
40. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). 
41. Press Release, White House, President to Attend Copenhagen Climate Talks (Nov. 25, 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-attend-copenhagen-climate-talks. 
42. Darren Samuelsohn & Lisa Friedman, Obama Announces 2020 Emissions Target, Dec. 9 
Copenhagen Visit, N.Y. TIMES GREEN (Nov. 25, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/11/25/25climatewire-obama-announces-2020-emissions-
target-dec-9-22088.html. 
43. Associated Press, China Vows to Slow Carbon Emissions Growth, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 26, 
2009), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34160921/ns/us_news-environment/t/china-vows-slow-
carbon-emissions-growth. 
44. Id. 
45. Ben Webster, Proposed Cuts in CO2 Can’t Stop a Catastrophe, Says Lord Stern, TIMES 
(London), Dec. 7, 2009, at 7; see also Ben Webster, Copenhagen Emissions Targets ‘Not Enough to 
Avert Catastrophic Warming,’ TIMES (London) (Dec. 7, 2009), 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article6946675.ece; Jeffery Frankel, The 
Copenhagen Accord: Real Progress Through 2020 Emission Goals?, E. ASIA F. (Mar. 19, 2010), 
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to the Chinese leadership that the two countries package their proposals 
together as part of a “G-2” effort to influence the Copenhagen 
negotiations, the Chinese insisted that any coordination should be done 
in the larger context of the G-20.46 
Representatives from 193 countries participated in the Copenhagen 
Conference and 119 heads of state attended, including President Obama, 
who made the most of his brief time there by inserting himself into a 
meeting with the leaders of China, Brazil, India, and South Africa.47 
Obama’s personal effort helped produce “The Copenhagen Accord,”48 
an agreement between the United States and leaders of these rapidly 
developing countries that was applauded by most, but not all of the other 
countries.49 The Accord recognizes “the scientific view that the increase 
in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius”50 and calls for 
consideration by 2015 of strengthening this long-term goal to 1.5 
degrees Celsius.51 Developed countries “commit to implement” 
economy-wide GHG emissions reductions by 2020, while developing 
countries will implement “[n]ationally appropriate mitigation actions.”52 
These reductions and actions were to be identified and reflected in 
submissions to the Conference of the Parties by January 31, 2010.53 In 
the face of objections from Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Sudan, Tuvalu, 
and Venezuela, the Conference of the Parties simply agreed to “take 
note” of the Copenhagen Accord, rather than formally adopting it.54 
                                                     
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/03/19/the-copenhagen-accord-real-progress-through-2020-
emission-goals. 
46. China Rejects G2, Short-Term Funds, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 12, 2009), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-12/12/content_9165554.htm. 
47. David Corn & Kate Sheppard, Obama’s Copenhagen Deal, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 18, 2009, 
5:46 PM), http://motherjones.com/environment/2009/12/obamas-copenhagen-deal. 
48. The text of the Accord is provided in U.N. Climate Change Conference 2009, Copenhagen, 
Den., Dec. 7–19, 2009, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Sess., 
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Copenhagen Accord], available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11a01.pdf. 
49. Heather Allen, Countries Pull Together in Final Hours of Copenhagen, SWITCHBOARD (Dec. 
19, 2009), http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/hallen/countries_pull_together_in_the.html. 
50. Copenhagen Accord, supra note 48, at 5. 
51. Id. at 7. 
52. Id. at 6. 
53. Id. 
54. Four Countries Hold Up Copenhagen Accord, DECCAN HERALD (Dec. 19, 2009), 
http://www.deccanherald.com/content/42118/four-countries-hold-up-copenhagen.html; John M. 
Broder, Climate Goal Is Supported by China and India, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, at A9, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/science/earth/10climate.html. 
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The outcome of the Copenhagen Conference reflects changing global 
political realities. China, Brazil, and India are now vitally important to 
the success of any global effort to control emissions of GHGs because of 
their rapidly growing economies and corollary GHG contributions. Their 
interests no longer are entirely congruent with the rest of the G-77 
developing countries. China now is the world’s leading emitter of 
GHGs, emitting 7.7 billion tons of carbon dioxide in 2009, compared to 
5.4 billion tons by the United States, which is second in absolute terms.55 
However, in per-capita terms China’s emissions are only about one-third 
those of the United States.56 
Although virtually all 193 nations agreed that climate change 
represents a global crisis that demands fundamental changes in the 
world’s energy infrastructure, their failure to produce a legally binding 
document mandating these changes reflects another global political 
reality—international law is moving away from multilateral consensus 
agreements due to the lack of a global enforcement infrastructure. As 
discussed above, developing instead is a kind of “global law”; countries 
now borrow law from one another and a few principal approaches to 
common problems emerge. 
Everyone understood the inadequacy of the commitments that were 
announced in Copenhagen.57 This understanding itself was a positive 
development even if the failure to achieve more dramatic emission 
reduction commitments was disappointing to most observers. As the 
damaging effects of climate change become more visible, domestic 
political support for more dramatic action is likely to grow in many 
countries, even if it is unlikely that a legally binding international treaty 
will be adopted. 
While much of the global press portrayed Copenhagen as a failure, 
some environmentalists disputed this assessment, arguing that it made a 
necessary end run around obstructionist countries that rendered the 
consensus-driven COP process ineffective.58 Shortly after the 
                                                     
55. Mark McCormick & Paul Scruton, An Atlas of Pollution: The World in Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions, GUARDIAN, http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-
files/Guardian/documents/2011/02/10/CarbonWeb.pdf (last visited Aug. 28, 2011). 
56. Simon Rogers & Lisa Evans, World Carbon Dioxide Emissions Data by Country: China 
Speeds Ahead of the Rest, GUARDIAN DATA BLOG (Jan. 31, 2011, 2:30 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/jan/31/world-carbon-dioxide-emissions-country-
data-co2. 
57. See John Vidal et al., Low Targets, Goals Dropped: Copenhagen Ends in Failure, 
GUARDIAN, Dec. 19, 2009, at 1, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-deal. 
58. For example, David Doniger, Policy Director for the Natural Resources Defense Council’s 
Climate Center, hailed the Copenhagen Accord as “a big step forward” and disputed arguments that 
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Copenhagen Conference adjourned, Yvo de Boer, the U.N. official who 
was in charge of the talks, called for an end to “fingerpointing” and 
“recriminations.”59 His statement was widely viewed as a rebuke to 
British Climate Minister Ed Miliband, who had blamed China for 
blocking greater progress at Copenhagen, sparking an angry response 
from Chinese officials.60 
A major question following the Copenhagen Accord was how many 
countries would submit emission reduction commitments and nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions by the January 31, 2010 deadline. 
Although there was considerable concern that China and India would not 
participate in this process, both the Chinese and Indian governments 
transmitted letters to the United Nations agreeing to associate their 
countries with the Copenhagen Accord.61 China repeated its voluntary 
goal of reducing the carbon intensity of its economy by forty to forty-
five percent below 2005 levels by 2020.62 India announced an 
aspirational target to reduce the carbon intensity of its economy by 
twenty to twenty-five percent below 2005 levels by 2020.63 India’s 
Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh stated that by listing itself as 
joining the accord, the country strengthened its negotiation position on 
climate change.64 As of April 2011, a total of 141 countries have agreed 
to the Copenhagen Accord.65 
B.  Control of Emissions from Global Maritime Operations 
Even though ocean shipping is a very energy-efficient mode of 
transport, ships are a significant, but as yet largely unregulated, source of 
GHG emissions.66 The fuel that ships use is so dirty that it creates 
                                                     
it was a failure because it will not keep the global temperature rise below two degrees Celsius, it 
does not mandate specific emissions cuts, and the commitments are not legally binding. Doniger, 
supra note 11. 
59. Fiona Harvey, UN Urges End to Climate Wrangling, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at 4, 
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e7670746-efe3-11de-833d-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1YSpTYNEm. 
60. Id. 
61. Broder, supra note 54, at A9. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Copenhagen Accord, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_accord/items/5262.php (last visited Aug. 28, 2011). 
66. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/GHG-
Emissions.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2011). 
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enormous pollution; in fact, many ships use bunker fuel with such high 
sulfur content that it has been estimated that just sixteen of the world’s 
largest ships can produce as much sulfur pollution as all of the world’s 
cars.67 It is also estimated that international shipping accounted for 870 
million tons of GHG emissions in 2007, or 2.7% of global emissions.68 
Despite the significant pollution emitted by ocean-going ships, the 
Kyoto Protocol and UNFCCC do not speak directly to regulation of 
shipping emissions, and nations largely leave regulatory control to the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO).69 But for decades the IMO 
has allowed ships to burn fuel containing up to 4.5% sulfur—4500 times 
more than the EU allows in gasoline.70 
1.  Efforts to Promote Further Reductions in Emissions from Ships 
In the absence of comprehensive environmental regulation for ships, 
countries and private shipping companies have fashioned various means 
to address the problem of shipping pollution. Countries have adopted 
multilateral agreements, entered into regional agreements, crafted their 
own regulatory standards, and one country has encouraged cooperation 
with private shipping companies. In addition, at least one shipping 
company has voluntarily undertaken measures to reduce its own 
pollution. An example of each one of these approaches is provided 
below. 
First, in an attempt to reduce shipping pollution in the absence of a 
comprehensive global treaty, countries have entered into multilateral 
agreements, including Annex VI of the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).71 As of the end of 2010, 
150 countries, representing nearly all of the world’s shipping, are parties 
to MARPOL.72 Different provisions of Annex VI authorize limitations 
                                                     
67. Fred Pearce, How 16 Ships Create as Much Pollution as All the Cars in the World, DAILY 
MAIL (London), Nov. 22, 2009, at 35, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-
1229857/How-16-ships-create-pollution-cars-world.html. 
68. Marine Env’t Prot. Comm., Int’l Mar. Org., Executive Summary: Prevention of Air Pollution 
from Ships, Apr. 9, 2009, MEPC 59/4/7, at 6, available at 
http://www5.imo.org/SharePoint/blastDataHelper.asp/data_id%3D26046/4-7.pdf. 
69. See id. 
70. Pearce, supra note 67. 
71. IMO, International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as Modified 
by the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto (MARPOL): Annex VI: Prevention of Air Pollution from 
Ships, http://www5.imo.org/SharePoint/contents.asp?doc_id=678&topic_id=258#11 (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2011) [hereinafter MARPOL Annex VI]. 
72. IMO, Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the 
International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General Performs Depositary or Other 
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on the release of sulfur and nitrogen oxides from ship exhaust and the 
sulfur content of fuels.73 They also allow countries to petition the IMO to 
establish emission control areas.74 
After it proved impossible to reach a global consensus on control of 
emissions from ships, countries have focused on fashioning regional 
approaches to combat this problem. 
For example, on March 27, 2009, the United States and Canada 
petitioned the IMO to establish an emissions control area (ECA) 
encompassing the countries’ coastlines.75 The U.S.–Canada proposal 
was accepted in July 2009 at the 59th session of the Marine Environment 
Protection Committee (MEPC) of the IMO.76 The North American ECA 
received formal approval at the 60th MEPC session in March 2010, and 
entered into force on August 1, 2011.77 
The North American ECA establishes a 230-mile buffer zone around 
the countries’ coastlines.78 While within this buffer zone, large ships will 
be subject to stricter emissions standards aimed at reducing the level of 
pollutants in the ships’ emissions.79 In order to achieve compliance with 
                                                     
Functions, at 101 (Aug. 1, 2011), 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20-
%202011.pdf. 
73. MARPOL Annex VI, supra note 71; see also IMO, International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as Modified by the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto 
(MARPOL): The Protocol of 1997, 
http://www5.imo.org/SharePoint/contents.asp?doc_id=678&topic_id=258#30 (last visited Aug. 28, 
2011) [hereinafter MARPOL Protocol of 1997]. 
74. IMO, The Protocol of 1997 (MARPOL Annex VI), 
http://www.imo.org/ourwork/environment/pollutionprevention/airpollution/pages/the-protocol-of-
1997-%28marpol-annex-vi%29.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2011). 
75. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, U.S. Proposes to Slash Harmful Ship Emissions 
Along the Nation’s Coastlines to Save Lives, (Mar. 30, 2009), 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/d0cf6618525a9efb85257359003fb69d/b7129c28691a2b8
685257589005ba9af!opendocument. See generally IMO, Sulphur Oxides (SOx) – Regulation 14, 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/PollutionPrevention/AirPollution/Pages/Sulphur-
oxides-%28SOx%29-%E2%80%93-Regulation-14.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2011) (describing 
ECAs as of October 2010). 
76. Marine Env’t Prot. Comm., IMO, Rep. on its 59th Sess., July 13–17, 2009, MEPC 59/24, at 
29–30 (July 27, 2009), http://www.uscg.mil/imo/mepc/docs/mepc59-report.pdf. 
77. Marine Env’t Prot. Comm., IMO, Rep. on its 60th Sess., Mar. 22–26, 2010, MEPC 60/22, at 
44 (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.uscg.mil/imo/mepc/docs/mepc60-report.pdf. 
78. Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 75; see also Marine Env’t Prot. Comm., IMO, 
Interpretations of, and Amendments to, MARPOL Sulphur Oxides and Particulate Matter, MEPC 
59/6/5, Annex II (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.epa.gov/nonroad/marine/ci/mepc-59-eca-
proposal.pdf. 
79. Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 75; see also Marine Env’t Prot. Comm., supra 
note 78. 
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the ECA, ships must use fuel with reduced sulfur content while within 
the ECA.80 Additionally, starting in 2016, new ships will be subject to 
advanced technologies to control NOx emissions.81 By 2020, the EPA 
anticipates these stringent emissions controls in the ECA will reduce 
shipping emission levels of NOx, particulate matter (PM2.5), and SOx 
respectively by 320,000, 90,000, and 920,000 tons.82 The EPA estimates 
that by 2020 the resulting pollution reduction could potentially save 
8300 American and Canadian lives each year.83 
In addition to the ECA proposal, the United States is taking other 
steps to reduce shipping emissions. On April 30, 2010, the EPA issued a 
final rule for large ships equivalent to the standards adopted in 
amendments to Annex VI of MARPOL.84 The emissions standards will 
have two stages of application. In 2011, all new engines will be required 
to employ more efficient engine technology, with anticipated NOx 
reductions of fifteen to twenty-five percent below current levels.85 In 
2016, new engines will be required to employ high efficiency engine 
technology like selective catalytic reduction to achieve NOx reductions 
of eighty percent below current levels.86 In addition to these emission 
standards, EPA limited the sulfur content (maximum concentration of 
1000 parts per million) of fuels to be used in U.S. waters.87 
After the December 2010 Cancún UNFCCC Conference failed to 
reach any international agreement for reducing GHG emissions from 
ships, Papua New Guinea proposed a reduction plan based on working 
with the private sector. Part of the plan involved charging vessels 
                                                     
80. Ocean Vessels and Large Ships, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/oceanvessels.htm [hereinafter Ocean Vessels]. From 2012 to 2014, vessels 
operating within the ECA cannot use fuel with sulfur concentrations greater than 10,000 parts per 
million (ppm). Id. Starting in 2015, the maximum allowable sulfur concentration in fuel is reduced 
to 1000 ppm. Id. In 2016, fuels will be subject to NOx aftertreatment requirements. Id. 
81. Id. NOx and SOx are terms that refer to the various oxides of nitrogen (NO, NO2) and the 
various oxides of sulfur (SO2 and SO3), pollutants that can harm human health and the environment. 
82. See Ocean Vessels, supra note 80. 
83. Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, supra note 75. 
84. See Ocean Vessels, supra note 80. The standards apply to all U.S.-flagged vessels with 
Category 3 marine diesel engines (engines with per-cylinder displacement of at least thirty liters). 
Id. 
85. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY ANNOUNCEMENT, EPA-420-F-09-068, EPA 
FINALIZES MORE STRINGENT STANDARDS FOR CONTROL OF EMISSIONS FROM NEW MARINE 
COMPRESSION-IGNITION ENGINES AT OR ABOVE 30 LITERS PER CYLINDER 3 (2009), 
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/regs/nonroad/marine/ci/420f09068.pdf. 
86. Id. 
87. See Ocean Vessels, supra note 80. 
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docking fees dependent on the level of carbon emitted.88 However, 
negotiations toward an international agreement were again hampered by 
division over application of the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibility.”89 A group of developing countries including Argentina, 
Brazil, China, India, and Saudi Arabia opposed a global standard; as a 
result, all language regarding shipping was removed from the 
negotiating text.90 
Finally, at least one private shipping company has undertaken its own 
pollution reduction plan. In September 2010, the Danish firm Maersk 
Line, the world’s largest container shipping company, announced that it 
would voluntarily use low-sulfur fuel while at berth in the port of Hong 
Kong, which handles nearly one-eighth of the world’s container ship 
traffic. Along with Civic Exchange, a Hong Kong-based NGO, Maersk 
urged all other Hong Kong shipping carriers to make the same 
commitment.91 Maersk estimates that the switch to low-sulfur fuel will 
cost an extra one million dollars a year, but that it will reduce emissions 
from its ships by eighty percent.92 
In addition, in February 2011, Maersk announced that it had ordered a 
new fleet of the ten largest container ships ever built—ships specifically 
designed to reduce carbon emissions. The ships, which will be built by 
Daewoo Shipbuilding in South Korea, are to be called the “Triple E” 
class because they provide economies of scale, energy efficiency, and 
environmental improvements.93 Maersk estimates that the ships will 
produce fifty percent less carbon emissions than existing ships operating 
between Asia and Europe.94 
                                                     
88. See Richard Black, Shipping to Steer Cleaner Carbon Course, BBC NEWS (Dec. 6, 2010, 
2:00 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-11931883. The Papua New Guinea 
proposal relied on engagement with the Carbon War Room ship efficiency ratings system described 
infra, note 107. Id. 
89. Cancun Fails to Deliver on Ship Emissions, SEAS AT RISK (Dec. 11, 2010), http://www.seas-
at-risk.org/news_n2.php?page=363. 
90. Id.; see also LLOYD’S REGISTER, THE OUTCOME OF COP 16 (2010), 
http://www.lr.org/Images/COP16%20briefing%20note_tcm155-205773.pdf. The estimated $10 
billion that would be raised by some form of carbon pricing could be devoted to developing 
countries’ transition to shipping industries with low carbon footprints. Id. 
91. Pamela Boykoff, Ship Firm Floats Plan to Cut Hong Kong Smog, CNN (Sept. 7, 2010, 1:39 
PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2010/BUSINESS/09/07/maersk.hong.kong.pollution/index.html. 
92. Id. 
93. John Vidal, Future of Ships: 20 Storeys Tall and 860m Bananas on Board, GUARDIAN, Feb. 
22, 2011, at 15 [hereinafter Future of Ships]; see also John Vidal, Maersk Claims New ‘Mega 
Containers’ Could Cut Shipping Emissions, GUARDIAN (Feb. 21, 2011, 4:21 PM) [hereinafter Mega 
Containers], http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/feb/21/maersk-containers-shipping-
emissions. 
94. Future of Ships, supra note 93; Mega Containers, supra note 93. 
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2.  IMO Consideration of a Global Approach to Reduce Ship 
Emissions 
Although for years the IMO has continued to resist efforts to adopt a 
more global approach, in September 2010 the IMO’s MEPC met in 
London to discuss methods and plans to reduce shipping emissions 
globally.95 Developed nations represented at the meeting stressed the 
importance of equal treatment of all countries as necessary for the 
functional economic effect of market-based mechanisms.96 Developing 
countries argued that the principle of “common but differentiated 
responsibility” reflected in the UNFCCC dictates that they should bear 
less of the burden of reducing emissions.97 
Two technical and operational measures examined at the London 
MEPC meeting included an Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) and 
a Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP).98 The EEDI is a 
performance-based instrument that establishes a mandatory energy 
efficiency level for all new ships.99 New ships can meet the required 
improvements in efficiency through any future cost-effective design 
measures.100 The SEEMP is a compilation of best practices for fuel-
efficient functioning of vessels.101 Although both the EEDI and SEEMP 
are currently voluntary measures, both measures were circulated to be 
considered for adoption by IMO parties at the July 2011 MEPC 
meeting.102 
While the London IMO meeting participants gave thorough 
consideration to multiple methods that could be components of a broader 
strategy to reduce shipping emissions, the parties were unable to reach 
                                                     
95. Will Nichols, IMO Floats Proposal for Cap on Shipping Emissions, BUSINESSGREEN (Sept. 
29, 2010), http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/analysis/1869813/imo-floats-proposal-cap-shipping-
emissions. 
96. Id. 
97. Interview with Peter Oppenheimer, Senior Counsel for Int’l Law, Nat’l Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Admin. (Oct. 12, 2010). 
98. IMO, Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) 61st Session: 27 September to 1 
October 2010 (Oct. 1, 2010), 
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/MeetingSummaries/MEPC/Pages/MEPC-61st-Session.aspx. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan, INT’L CHAMBER OF SHIPPING, 
http://www.shippingandco2.org/SEEMP.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2011). 
102.  Proposed GHG amendments to MARPOL Convention Circulated for Adoption in 2011, as 
IMO Heads to Cancún Climate Change Conference, INT’L MAR. ORG. (Nov. 25, 2010), 
http://www.imo.org/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/GHG-amendments-criculated.aspx. 
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an agreement.103 Several potential deals were rejected at the meeting, 
including a carbon tax across the entire shipping industry and a shipping 
emissions cap-and-trade program.104 The lack of agreement is largely 
attributable to differences between developed and developing countries 
regarding whether mandatory emission reductions should be part of an 
agreement.105 
Other factors complicating an agreement include the difficulty 
associated with measuring shipping emissions and whether to apply the 
GHG reduction and efficiency requirements to existing ships.106 
Measuring emissions from vessels registered and operating all over the 
world involves great practical difficulty.107 Emissions are currently 
measured as a function of fuel use when ships refuel at port.108 
Additionally, ownership is complex in international shipping. A ship 
could be owned by a company in one country, registered in a second 
country, and operate between two additional countries.109 These 
complexities in the measurement of individual vessel emissions and in 
vessel ownership make it difficult to attribute responsibility for shipping 
emissions to one particular country. 
                                                     
103. Choppy Waters Ahead for Global Shipping Emissions Deal, BUSINESSGREEN (Oct. 4, 2010), 
http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/1870093/choppy-waters-ahead-global-shipping-emissions-
deal. 
104. Id. 
105. Nichols, supra note 95. 
106. Id. 
107. See Will Nichols, Have the EU’s Shipping Emissions Proposals Capsized?, 
BUSINESSGREEN (Dec. 23, 2010), http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/1933984/eus-shipping-
emissions-proposals-capsized. But see Black, supra note 88; Smokestack Lightening, THE 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 11, 2010, at 76, available at http://www.economist.com/node/17676040; Fiona 
Harvey, Cancun – The Shipping News, FIN. TIMES ENERGY SOURCE (Dec. 6, 2010, 11:57 AM), 
http://blogs.ft.com/energy-source/2010/12/06/cancun-the-shipping-news. Richard Branson founded 
the Carbon War Room project to create an online database grading over 60,000 commercial ships 
according to emissions produced. The project aims at producing a data hub to enable businesses and 
customers to make more informed business decisions regarding their carbon footprint from 
shipping. There is great potential for the website to serve as a tool to green corporations’ supply 
chains and to allow government to assign differential landing charges according to ship emission 
levels. Black, supra note 88. 
108. APOLLONIA MIOLA ET AL., JOINT RESEARCH CTR., REGULATING AIR EMISSIONS FROM 
SHIPS: THE STATE OF THE ART ON METHODOLOGIES, TECHNOLOGIES AND POLICY OPTIONS 23–24 
(2010), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/jrc/downloads/jrc_reference_report_2010_11_ships_emissions.pdf; 
see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, [2 ENERGY] 2006 IPCC GUIDELINES 
FOR NATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORIES 3.10 (2006), http://www.ipcc-
nggip.iges.or.jp/public/2006gl/pdf/2_Volume2/V2_3_Ch3_Mobile_Combustion.pdf. 
109. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE TECHBOOK: MARINE SHIPPING 2 
(2010), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/MarineShipping.pdf. 
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Another complicating factor is the issue of whether to apply standards 
retroactively to already-existing vessels. Even if the IMO were to 
establish standards applicable to new ships tomorrow, it would take a 
long time for reductions in shipping emissions to be felt throughout the 
vessel fleet. Most ships have a lifetime of at least twenty years; unless 
emission reduction requirements apply to existing ships, the full 
decrease in emissions will not take effect until the fleet turns over.110 But 
forcing existing ships to undergo retrofitting to meet increased standards 
could be an expensive proposition for ship owners and operators. 
Ultimately, the inability of these broader international forums to reach 
agreements targeting shipping emissions increases the expectation that 
nations will turn to regional plans to achieve reductions.111 The next 
IMO meeting was in July 2011, and post-Cancún, the IMO is still the 
primary holder of authority to regulate international shipping 
emissions.112 However, the EU has pledged to regulate shipping 
emissions within its boundaries if substantial steps toward global 
agreement are not taken by 2012.113 If there are no steps toward 
international agreement by 2012, the EU plans to incorporate shipping 
emissions into the EU Emissions Trading Scheme for 2013.114 
C.  Global Consensus on Unreasonably Dangerous Products: 
Asbestos and Gasoline Lead Additives 
While harmonization will not generally result in unanimous adoption 
of certain norms, something close to unanimous adoption has been 
achieved regarding two unreasonably dangerous products: asbestos and 
gasoline lead additives. In the past, when the developed world banned or 
severely restricted the use of a product or chemical, companies often 
redoubled their efforts to create markets for it in the developing world. 
For example, when the EPA was considering phasing out all remaining 
uses of asbestos in the early 1980s, the Canadian asbestos industry’s 
trade association, the Asbestos Institute, persuaded the World Bank’s 
                                                     
110. Nichols, supra note 95. 
111. Choppy Waters Ahead, supra note 103. 
112. Shipping Left to Plot GHG Course, for Now, CARBON POSITIVE (Dec. 15, 2010), 
http://www.carbonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspx?articleID=2218. 
113. Id. 
114. See Nichols, supra note 107. However, a report by the Joint Research Centre of the 
European Commission challenges the enforceability of any such program. The report describes how 
any countries that try to exclude noncompliant vessels from docking could face legal action. If the 
ships are flying flags of countries outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the EU, excluding 
countries would need an extra-territorial basis for jurisdiction. Id. 
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fledgling Environment Division to promote greater use of asbestos in 
developing countries.115 When the Environmental Defense Fund exposed 
what had happened, World Bank President Barber Conable quickly 
apologized and vowed that it would not happen again.116 
Today nearly all the developed world has formally banned or largely 
eliminated the use of asbestos. The International Ban Asbestos 
Secretariat lists fifty-five countries that have adopted national asbestos 
bans and two others—Singapore and Taiwan—that no longer use the 
product.117 While global consumption of asbestos had been declining, in 
recent years there has been a sharp increase in the use of this deadly 
product in China and India, which have not followed the lead of the 
developed world in banning or strictly controlling asbestos.118 China is 
now the world’s largest consumer and second-largest producer of 
asbestos, using 626,000 metric tons of asbestos fiber in 2007 and mining 
280,000 tons of it in 2008.119 India is the next largest consumer of 
asbestos, though it uses less than half as much as China.120 
The asbestos example illustrates that globalization has not entirely 
halted the export of unreasonably dangerous products from developed 
countries to the developing world. However, a greater success story for 
global health is the phaseout of leaded gasoline. Congress and the EPA 
banned the use of lead additives in gasoline, effective in 1986, after 
overwhelming evidence revealed that it contributed to widespread lead 
poisoning that caused extensive neurological damage in children.121 This 
phase-out is widely believed to be one of the greatest public health 
                                                     
115. Michael Huncharek, Exporting Asbestos: Disease and Policy in the Developing World, 14 J. 
PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 51, 52 (1993), available at http://www.jstor.org/pss/3342826; see also Rick 
Boychuck, Asbestos Exports: Canada Helps a Killer Industry, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, March 
1988, at 26; Laurie Kazan-Allen, Canadian Asbestos: A Global Concern, INT’L BAN ASBESTOS 
SECRETARIAT (Oct. 23, 2003), http://ibasecretariat.org/lka_ottawa_conf_rep_03.php. 
116. As a young attorney for the Environmental Defense Fund, I personally participated in these 
events, including the meeting with President Conable. 
117. Current Asbestos Bans and Restrictions, INT’L BAN ASBESTOS SECRETARIAT (Jan. 6, 2011), 
http://ibasecretariat.org/alpha_ban_list.php. The EPA banned the most ubiquitous uses of asbestos 
in the 1970s. Although a judicial decision overturned the EPA’s 1989 ban on all remaining uses of 
asbestos, Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1229–30 (5th Cir. 1991), the court 
upheld the agency’s ban on all new uses of asbestos, keeping the industry in a state of perpetual 
decline in the United States, id. at 1229. 
118. Jim Morris & Te-Ping Chen, A Ravenous Appetite for Asbestos, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY 
(July 21, 2010), http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/asbestos/articles/entry/2194. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. See Small Refiner Lead Phasedown Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 511, 531 (D.C. Cir. 
1983). 
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triumphs for the EPA in the agency’s more than four decades of 
operation. As indicated in the map below, which was prepared by the 
United Nations Environment Programme, today nearly all countries have 
phased out the use of leaded gasoline.122 Notwithstanding the handful of 
countries that still permit its use, leaded gasoline is a powerful example 
of how a global norm can arise without the need for a multilateral 
environmental agreement seeking to mandate its adoption. 
 
FIGURE III. MAP SHOWING STATUS OF LEADED GASOLINE PHASE-
OUT BY COUNTRY AS OF JANUARY 2011 
III.  TRANSNATIONAL LIABILITY LITIGATION 
International law has failed to develop an effective system of liability 
and compensation for transboundary environmental harm, despite 
promises to do so that date as far back as the 1972 United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm.123 Principle 22 of 
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration pledged that “[s]tates shall co-operate 
to develop further the international law regarding liability and 
                                                     
122. U.N. Environment Programme, Leaded Petrol Phase-out: Global Status January 2011, 
http://www.unep.org/transport/PCFV/PDF/MapWorldLead_January2011.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 
2011). 
123. This subject is explored in more detail in Percival, supra note 1. 
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compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental 
damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such 
States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.”124 Twenty years later at the 
Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the nations of the world adopted the Rio 
Declaration, which in nearly identical language directed states to 
“cooperate in an expeditious and more determined manner to develop 
further international law regarding liability and compensation for 
adverse effects of environmental damage caused by activities within 
their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction.”125 
In the absence of an effective international law regime of liability and 
compensation for environmental torts involving people and corporate 
entities located in more than one country, transnational liability litigation 
has surged. These cases generally involve efforts to seek redress for 
harm that has not been successfully prevented by regulatory standards. 
In many cases the harm has arisen because developing countries do not 
have effective regulatory systems to control risky activities. In other 
cases, foreign plaintiffs have sought to piggyback on successful U.S. 
litigation. This section reviews five different attempts at transnational 
liability litigation: (1) tobacco litigation, (2) litigation against Chevron 
for oil pollution in Ecuador, (3) litigation against Occidental Petroleum 
for oil pollution in Peru, (4) Transnational DBCP Litigation, and (5) the 
Trafigura litigation. These lawsuits are part of the emergence of global 
law because they help to promote the development of global norms for 
acceptable corporate behavior and create pressure to clarify standards for 
enforcement of foreign judgments. 
A. Efforts by Foreign Governments to Hold U.S. Tobacco Companies 
Liable 
The first example of transnational liability litigation involves 
environmental health efforts by foreign governments to sue U.S. tobacco 
companies. Although efforts by private plaintiffs to recover in tort 
against these companies had been largely unsuccessful for decades, in 
November 1998 the U.S. tobacco industry settled lawsuits brought 
against it by the attorneys general of most states.126 In the Master 
                                                     
124. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swe., June 5–16, 1972, 
Report of U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, princ. 22, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 
(June 16, 1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972). 
125. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., June 
3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 13, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992). 
126. Master Settlement Agreement (Nov. 23, 1998) Exhibit A, 
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Settlement Agreement the companies agreed to pay the states more than 
$200 billion over twenty-five years to compensate the states for 
increased health care costs engendered by the victims of diseases caused 
by smoking.127 
In the wake of this settlement, several foreign governments brought 
lawsuits against tobacco manufacturers in U.S. courts.128 These suits 
took one of two forms: suits to recover the government’s health care 
expenses for citizens’ tobacco-related illnesses129 and suits to recover tax 
revenues lost due to alleged cigarette smuggling on the black market.130 
Many legal analysts believed that the United States was an ideal forum 
because of its liberal discovery rules and because the losing party would 
not be required to pay the prevailing party’s costs.131 Despite the 
perceived advantages of a U.S. courtroom, all of these suits ultimately 
were dismissed.132 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Ukraine, and Venezuela all filed suits in U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia to recover the costs of 
treating their citizens’ tobacco-related illnesses.133 Each country based 
its claim on the theory that since the 1970s tobacco manufacturers had 
been engaged in a conspiracy to conceal and misrepresent the health 
risks of smoking.134 Guatemala’s suit against Phillip Morris and several 
leading tobacco manufacturers was a landmark test case.135 The court, 
                                                     
http://www.naag.org/backpages/naag/tobacco/msa/msa-pdf/MSA%20with%20Sig%20Pages%20an
d%20Exhibits.pdf (providing a list of participating States and their allocated percentages of the 
settlement agreement). Tobacco use is properly considered an environmental risk in light of the 
risks posed by exposure to second-hand smoke. 
127. See id. 
128. CTR. FOR COMMC’NS, HEALTH, & ENV’T, TOBACCO FACT SHEET, LITIGATION AGAINST THE 
TOBACCO INDUSTRY 2 (2000), 
http://www.ceche.org/publications/factshts/factsheets_files/toblitigation.pdf. 
129. The Governments of Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Ukraine raised this claim. VANESSA 
BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33719, TOBACCO: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 2 (2007), 
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL33719.pdf. 
130. Countries raising this claim included Canada, the European Community, Honduras, 
Ecuador, Belize, and political subdivisions of the Republic of Columbia. Brenda Mallinak, The 
Revenue Rule: A Common Law Doctrine for the Twenty First Century, 16 DUKE J. OF COMP. & 
INT’L. L. 79, 102 (2006). 
131. CTR. FOR COMMC’NS, HEALTH & ENV’T, supra note 128. 
132. BURROWS, supra note 129. 
133. Sean D. Murphy ed., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International 
Law: Guatemalan Suit Against U.S. Tobacco Companies, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 516, 543 (2000). 
134. Id. 
135. In re Tobacco/Gov’t Health Care Costs Litig., 83 F. Supp. 2d 125 (D.D.C. 1999). In addition 
to common law tort claims, the Guatemalan government claimed violations of the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and violations of federal and District of 
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applying the test for remoteness from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Holmes v. Securities Investors Protection Corp.,136 dismissed the case 
for remoteness.137 The doctrine of remoteness provides that a plaintiff 
cannot recover for harm flowing merely from the misfortunes of a third 
person caused by the defendant’s action.138 The court also found 
Guatemala’s claims to be completely derivative of the choices made and 
the injuries suffered by individual citizens.139 Thus, the several steps that 
the court would have to take to trace the defendant’s action to the 
Guatemalan government’s injury rendered the injury too remote and 
attenuated.140 The court also found that Guatemala could not sue in a 
parens patriae action because the government could not articulate a 
sufficiently concrete quasi-sovereign interest apart from the particular 
interests of private parties.141 
Suits brought by other foreign governments raised the same claims 
and were ultimately dismissed for remoteness. Nicaragua and Ukraine 
also saw their cases dismissed.142 Bolivia’s143 and Venezuela’s144 claims, 
filed in state court, were consolidated in multidistrict litigation.145 
Venezuela’s claim ultimately was dismissed because the court held that 
the government’s injuries were too remote, indirect, and derivative.146 
Panama’s and Brazil’s claims, both filed in Delaware state court,147 also 
                                                     
Columbia antitrust laws. Id. at 127. 
136. 503 U.S. 258 (1992). 
137. In re Tobacco, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 126, 128. 
138. Id. at 128. 
139. Id. at 129. 
140. Id. at 130. The court also found that it would have to develop complicated rules to apportion 
damages among different levels of injury. Id. 
141. Id. at 133. The court found that Guatemala’s interest in recovering for injuries to its treasury, 
incurred by paying millions to treat tobacco-related illnesses, was a proprietary, not quasi-sovereign, 
interest. Id. at 134. 
142. Murphy, supra note 133, at 543; Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Health & Welfare Fund v. Philip 
Morris Inc., 249 F.3d 1068, 1071 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
143. Republic of Bol. v. Philip Morris Cos., 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (S.D. Tex. 1999). 
144. Republic of Venez. ex rel. Garrido v. Philip Morris Cos., 827 So. 2d 339 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2002). 
145. In re Tobacco/Gov’t Health Care Costs Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 5, 6 (D.D.C. 1999). 
146. Republic of Venez., 827 So. 2d at 341. 
147. Panama brought claims under Panamanian civil law and Brazil brought claims under 
Brazilian civil law. Both countries brought claims under Delaware law. Republic of Pan. v. Am. 
Tobacco Co., No. 05C–07–181–RRC, 2006 WL 1933740, at *1 (Del. Super. 2006), aff’d sub nom. 
State of São Paulo of Federative Republic of Braz. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 919 A.2d 1116 (Del. 2007). 
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were dismissed for remoteness and failure to meet the requirements for 
parens patriae standing.148 
In addition, Canada, the European Community, Honduras, Ecuador, 
Belize, and political subdivisions of the Republic of Columbia filed suit 
against U.S. tobacco manufacturers under the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to recover costs incurred as a result 
of an alleged conspiracy to smuggle cigarettes on the black market.149 
Canada’s150 and Ecuador’s151 claims were both dismissed when the court 
determined that the revenue rule barred the claims. The revenue rule 
provides that “courts of one sovereign will not enforce final tax 
judgments or unadjudicated tax claims of other sovereigns.”152 The 
failure of these suits demonstrates that U.S. courts are generally hostile 
to tort litigation brought by foreign plaintiffs. However, even when 
transnational litigation fails in court, it serves a vital purpose, because it 
draws attention to environmentally destructive practices that companies 
should abandon. 
B.  Litigation Against Chevron for Oil Pollution in Ecuador 
The hostility of U.S. courts towards tort litigation by foreign plaintiffs 
has also extended to lawsuits seeking recovery for environmental harm 
caused by U.S. corporations in other countries. The most significant 
example of such litigation is the decades-old battle between residents of 
Ecuador’s Amazon region and the U.S. oil company that Ecuador’s 
government had invited to develop oil resources in the country during 
the 1970s. This litigation may help reshape transnational norms 
concerning corporate behavior and standards of due process necessary 
for the enforcement of foreign judgments. 
While a refusal by U.S. courts to grant relief often signaled the end of 
litigation by foreign plaintiffs, long-running litigation against Chevron 
for oil pollution in Ecuador may change this perception. For nearly two 
decades, residents of the Oriente region of Ecuador have been suing 
Texaco (and its successor corporation, Chevron). These residents are 
                                                     
148. Id. at *7–9. The governments also failed to establish the substantive applicable law of 
Panama and Brazil. Id. at *4. 
149. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 251, 265 
(2006). 
150. Att’y Gen. of Can. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2001). 
151. Republic of Ecuador v. Philip Morris Cos., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff’d sub 
nom. Republic of Hond. v. Philip Morris Cos., 341 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2003). 
152. Att’y Gen. of Can., 268 F.3d at 109. 
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seeking compensation for, and remediation of, severe pollution from oil 
drilling operations that occurred during the 1970s.153 Legal proceedings 
have ranged from the United States to Ecuador to the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration in The Hague. Most recently, these proceedings also 
returned to the United States; immediately before an Ecuadoran court 
issued an $18 billion judgment against it, Chevron filed a racketeering 
lawsuit against the Ecuadoran plaintiffs and their attorneys in a U.S. 
court. 
1.  Litigation Overview 
The litigation began in 1993 when Ecuadoran plaintiffs filed suit 
against Texaco in U.S. federal court under the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS).154 Texaco initially persuaded a federal trial court in New York to 
dismiss the litigation on the ground of forum non conveniens. But in 
Jota v. Texaco, Inc.,155 the Second Circuit reversed this dismissal. The 
Second Circuit held that the district court should not have used the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens to dismiss the case without at least 
requiring the company to submit to Ecuador’s jurisdiction.156 In 
subsequent litigation the court affirmed the dismissal of the suit only on 
the condition that Texaco submit to the jurisdiction of the Ecuadoran 
courts.157 This dismissal was widely viewed as Texaco’s escape from 
liability. 
The May 2003 refiling of the case in Ecuador by forty-eight residents 
of the afflicted Oriente region challenged this perception.158 Chevron 
advanced three arguments in its defense: (1) everything it did in Ecuador 
was legal; (2) it spent $40 million on environmental cleanup; and (3) the 
                                                     
153. See generally Judith Kimerling, Indigenous Peoples and the Oil Frontier in Amazonia: The 
Case of Ecuador, ChevronTexaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 413 (2006) 
(discussing Texaco’s exploitation of crude oil in Ecuador). 
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The ATS, which was adopted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear a civil action by “an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350. 
155. Jota v. Texaco Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 163 (2d Cir. 1998). 
156. Id. at 153. 
157. Aguinda v. Texaco Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 478 (2d Cir. 2002). 
158. Complaint, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 002-2003 (Super. Ct. of Justice of 
“Nueva Loja” in Lago Agrio, May 7, 2003), 
http://www.contractormisconduct.org/ass/contractors/140/cases/750/866/chevrontexaco-aguinda_co
mplaint.pdf (translated complaint); Lucien J. Dhooge, Aguinda v. ChevronTexaco: Discretionary 
Grounds for the Non-recognition of Foreign Judgments for Environmental Injury in the United 
States, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 241, 242 (2010).  
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Ecuadoran government released it from further liability to the 
government in 1992 when Texaco left the country.159 The plaintiffs 
claim that this settlement with an overly compliant government does not 
absolve Texaco of responsibility for the harm their activities caused to 
the individual plaintiffs in the lawsuit.160 
On May 21, 2010, Chevron filed a request for dismissal of a court-
appointed expert and rejection of the expert’s assessment that oil 
pollution in the Oriente region had caused $27 billion in damages.161 
Chevron claimed that the appointee, Richard Cabrera, worked directly 
with the plaintiffs and their consultants through ongoing contacts and 
provision of materials from the plaintiffs.162 Plaintiffs argued that 
Cabrera sought materials from both parties, but Chevron did not 
participate.163 Chevron already argued that Cabrera was not independent 
in 2008 when Cabrera estimated damages at $27 billion.164 Chevron 
claimed that Cabrera’s estimates exceeded the scope of his mandate and 
contained inconsistencies.165 
The evidentiary phase of the case in Ecuador ended in December 
2010,166 and final arguments were submitted to the court at the end of 
January 2011.167 On February 14, 2011, the court in Lago Agria, 
Ecuador, released a 188-page decision awarding approximately $8.6 
billion in damages for the remediation of contaminated soils.168 While 
far less than the $27 billion estimated by the court-appointed expert, the 
judgment also included $8.6 billion in punitive damages and an award of 
$860 million to the plaintiffs, bringing the total judgment to $18 
billion.169 Chevron is now scrambling to prevent any future enforcement 
                                                     
159. Percival, supra note 1, at 58. 
160. Id. 
161. Chevron Asks Ecuador Court to Dismiss Key Expert, REUTERS (May 24, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64N59320100524. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. 
165. Dhooge, supra note 158, at 260. 
166. Hugh Bronstein, Film Outtakes Steal Stage in Chevron Ecuador Case, REUTERS (Jan. 11, 
2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1024757420110111. 
167. Braden Reddall & Dan Levine, Chevron Accuses Ecuadorean Plaintiffs of Extortion, 
REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE7110TH20110202. 
168. Ben Casselman et al., Chevron Hit with Record Judgment, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2011, at A1 
[hereinafter Record Judgment I]; see also Ben Casselman, Chevron Hit with Record Judgment, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Record Judgment II], 
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB10001424052748703584804576144464044068664,00.html. 
169. SIMON BILLENNESS & SANFORD LEWIS, AN ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL AND 
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of the judgment.170 
Since 2009, Chevron has vowed that it will not pay an enormous 
judgment and that it will fight in the courts of both Ecuador and the 
United States for decades if necessary. While some shareholders have 
urged the company to settle, Chevron spokesperson Don Campbell told 
the Wall Street Journal, “We’re not going to be bullied into a 
settlement” because the company has done nothing wrong.171 
2. Chevron’s RICO Lawsuit and the Battle over “Crude” Outtakes 
On February 2, 2011, Chevron filed suit against the Ecuadoran 
plaintiffs, their lawyers, and supporters from both the United States and 
Ecuador.172 Chevron filed the lawsuit under the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act,173 alleging that the defendants’ 
“ultimate aim is to create enough pressure on Chevron in the United 
States to extort it into paying to stop the campaign against it.”174 
Chevron seeks a judicial declaration finding any judgment by the 
Ecuadoran court to be fraudulent and unenforceable.175 Additionally, 
Chevron is asking for damages consistent with costs from defending the 
Ecuadoran lawsuit.176 Chevron bases its claim on alleged collusion 
between the plaintiffs and Richard Cabrera, the expert who estimated 
damages and remediation costs at $27 billion.177 Chevron’s evidence 
centers on footage from the 2009 documentary Crude and plaintiffs’ 
documents release by the Ecuadoran plaintiffs’ former lawyer, Steven 
Donziger.178 
                                                     
OPERATIONAL RISKS TO CHEVRON CORPORATION FROM AGUINDA V. CHEVRONTEXACO 5 (2011), 
http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/Chevron-Ecuador_Risk_Analysis_Report_May2011.pdf. 
170.  Record Judgment I, supra note 168, at A1; Record Judgment II, supra note 168. 
171. Ben Casselman, Chevron Expects to Fight Ecuador Lawsuit in U.S.—As Largest 
Environmental Judgment on Record Looms, the Oil Company Reassures Shareholders it Won’t Pay, 
WALL ST. J., July 20, 2009, at B3. 
172.  Reddall & Levine, supra note 167. 
173. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006). 
174. Amended Complaint at 1, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 1:11-cv-00691-LAK, 2011 WL 
1805313 (S.D.N.Y. April, 20, 2011). 
175. Press Release, Chevron Corp., Chevron Files Fraud and RICO Case Against Lawyers and 
Consultants Behind Ecuador Litigation (Feb. 1, 2011), 
http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/02012011_chevronfilesfraudandricocaseagai
nstlawyersandconsultantsbehindecuadorlitigation.news. 
176. Id. 
177. Reddall & Levine, supra note 167. 
178. Id. Documentary footage was obtained by Chevron through litigation in U.S. courts. 
Specifically, the district court and the Second Circuit addressed discovery requests from litigation in 
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Chevron obtained the documents referenced in Chevron’s RICO 
lawsuit through a series of legal proceedings filed in the United States.179 
Chevron is using these documents to bolster its accusations of fraud; 
according to a Chevron spokesperson, “We’ve been able to uncover 
evidence of fraud, of attorney misconduct. It shows just how illegitimate 
the process in Ecuador has become.”180 As noted by at least one of the 
U.S. judges adjudicating Chevron’s recent accusations, these statements 
make a striking contrast to the arguments used by Chevron in its forum 
non conveniens arguments.181 
Chevron has been compelling discovery through a series of federal 
court filings throughout the United States. Defendants in these filings 
include the Ecuadoran plaintiffs’ lawyers and experts used in the 
Ecuadoran litigation.182 Discovery was intended to support both the 
Ecuadoran litigation and Chevron’s international arbitration claim.183 
Chevron’s complaints include assertions that privileged information 
should also be released because of the crime-fraud exception. Courts 
have both accepted and rejected this assertion.184 A judge in the Western 
                                                     
Ecuador relating to indictment of two lawyers representing Chevron. In re Application of Chevron 
Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 291–92 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 
629 F.3d 297, 306–11 (2d Cir. 2011); Mark Hamblett, Chevron Presses Panel to Allow Review of 
Film’s Raw Footage, 243 N.Y.L.J. 1 (2010). As part of the defense for the two Chevron lawyers in 
Ecuador, Chevron sought subpoenas for outtake footage from a New York documentary filmmaker, 
who was hired by plaintiffs’ counsel to film the litigation process from the plaintiffs’ perspectives. 
Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d at 285. The Second Circuit granted Chevron’s request. 629 F.3d at 
310–11. 
179. David R. Baker, Chevron Tries to Turn Foes’ Words Against Them, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 29, 
2010, at D1. 
180. Id. at D5. 
181. See Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d at 298–99 (noting that Chevron “extolled the virtues of 
the Ecuadorian legal system while the plaintiffs questioned its abilities and rectitude” during 
Chevron’s earlier request for dismissal, and suggesting that the change to a more plaintiff-friendly 
national government may have something to do with this role reversal). 
182. See, e.g., In re Chevron Corp., 753 F. Supp. 2d 536, 538, 541 (D.M.D. 2010) (granting 
discovery request to compel documents from experts who suggested $113 billion in damages was a 
more appropriate amount than the previous amount of $27 billion). 
183. In re Application of Chevron Corp., 762 F. Supp. 2d 242, 248 (D. Mass. 2010). 
184. Compare Chevron Corp. v. Camp, Nos. 1:10mc27, 1:10mc28, 2010 WL 3418394, at *6, 
(W.D.N.C. Aug. 28, 2010) (finding that privileged information could be compelled for discovery), 
with Chevron Corp., 762 F. Supp. 2d at 254, (finding that Chevron had not met the “heavy burden 
in establishing that narrow exception”), and Chevron Corp. v. Stratus Consulting, Inc., No. 10-cv-
00047-MSK-MEH, 2010 WL 3923092, at *11, (D. Colo. Oct. 1, 2010) (declining to decide the 
crime-fraud allegation and leaving it “to the discretion and jurisdiction of the Ecuadorian court”), 
and In re Veiga, 746 F. Supp. 2d 27, 46 (D.D.C. 2010) (declining to decide on the crime-fraud 
exception), appeal dismissed, No. 10-7145, 2010 WL 5140467 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 17, 2010), and 
appeal dismissed, No. 10-7144, 2011 WL 1765213 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 18, 2011). 
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District of North Carolina compelled discovery of privileged information 
and made the following statement: 
While this court is unfamiliar with the practices of the 
Ecuadorian judicial system, the court must believe that the 
concept of fraud is universal, and that what has blatantly 
occurred in this matter would in fact be considered fraud by any 
court. If such conduct does not amount to fraud in a particular 
country, then that country has larger problems than an oil 
spill.185 
3. Arbitration Suits Filed by Chevron at the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration 
As part of its defense strategy, Chevron has sought to multiply the 
venues in which the plaintiffs must fight by seeking the assistance of 
other tribunals. In September 2009, Chevron filed an international 
arbitration claim against the government of Ecuador in the Permanent 
Court of Arbitration in The Hague.186 Chevron based its claim on what it 
calls the Ecuadoran government’s “exploitation” of the lawsuit.187 
Specifically, Chevron claims that the government of Ecuador violated its 
obligations under the U.S.–Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty, other 
investment agreements, and international law.188 Chevron alleges that 
the Ecuadoran government did this by colluding with the plaintiffs and 
their counsel, violating contracts with Texaco Petroleum,189 and 
instigating an “inappropriate[] criminal[]” indictment and sanction of 
two Chevron lawyers.190 Chevron is asking the tribunal to enforce its 
1998 cleanup agreement with the government of Ecuador and the U.S.–
Ecuador investment treaty.191 
While Chevron’s move was widely expected, many observers thought 
                                                     
185. Camp, 2010 WL 3418394, at *6. 
186. Press Release, Chevron Corp., Chevron Files International Arbitration Against the 
Government of Ecuador Over Violations of the United States–Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://www.chevron.com/news/press/release/?id=2009-09-23; Angel 
Gonzalez & Ben Casselman, Chevron Plaintiffs Ask U.S. Court for Action, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 
2010, at B3, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704363504575003153443151606.html. 
187. Press Release, Chevron Corp., supra note 186. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Ecuador v. Chevron, No. 09 Civ. 9958(LBS), 2010 WL 1028349, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. March 16, 
2010). 
191. Press Release, Chevron Corp., supra note 186. 
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it would not occur until after litigation against the company concluded in 
Ecuadoran courts. Chevron claimed that it had no choice because 
“Ecuador’s judicial system is incapable of functioning independently of 
political influence.”192 Ecuadoran Attorney General Diego Garcia 
rejected Chevron’s effort to impugn the integrity of the Ecuadoran 
judiciary.193 Garcia noted that the plaintiffs in the lawsuit before the 
Ecuadoran court are not parties to the arbitration proceeding Chevron 
has initiated in The Hague.194 Ecuador brought suit in the Southern 
District of New York to enjoin the arbitration. However, the Southern 
District recognized the “arbitrability” of Chevron’s claim and denied the 
Republic of Ecuador’s request for an injunction and summary judgment 
against Chevron’s arbitration claim.195 The Second Circuit affirmed an 
appeal of this judgment in 2011.196 
4. Judicial Recusal and Judgment in the Ecuador Trial Court 
When the Ecuadoran trial court finally reached its judgment in 
February 2011, the judge issuing the decision was the third judge to hear 
the case in Ecuador. In September 2009, Judge Juan Núñez recused 
himself from the case after Chevron released video that the company 
claimed showed the judge was committed to ruling against the oil 
company.197 In the video, which was posted on Chevron’s website, the 
judge reportedly refuses to reveal the verdict several times, but then 
responds “Yes, sir” to an inquiry as to whether Chevron “is the guilty 
party.”198 The video also reportedly contains a discussion of how 
Chevron’s remediation funds will be spent and a suggestion that some 
could be used to pay off government officials. The video was covertly 
filmed by an Ecuadoran former contractor for Chevron who the oil 
company claims was acting entirely independently. While Judge Núñez 
claimed the video had been doctored and denied that he had prejudged 
                                                     
192. Id. 
193. See Santiago Cueto, Chevron Files for International Arbitration Claim Against Ecuador: 
Forum Shopping at the Hague?, CHEVRON IN ECUADOR (Sept. 28. 2009), 
http://www.chevroninecuador.com/2009/09/chevron-files-international-arbitration.html. 
194. See id. 
195. Ecuador, 2010 WL 1028349, at *2. 
196. Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638 F.3d 384, 388 (2d Cir. 2011). 
197. David R. Baker, Judge in Case Against Chevron Recuses Himself in Wake of Tapes, S.F. 
CHRON., Sept. 5, 2009, at D1; see also David R. Baker, Judge Recuses Himself in Suit Against 
Chevron, SFGATE.COM (Sept. 5, 2009), http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-09-
05/business/17205188_1_tapes-videos-case. 
198. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the case,199 Washington Pezántes, the attorney general of Ecuador, asked 
the judge to recuse himself.200 In October 2010, the Judicial Council 
disbarred Judge Núñez for his conduct in the case.201 Judge Núñez’s 
successor, Judge Leonardo Ordonez, was replaced in October 2010 at 
the request of Chevron.202 Chevron based this request on Judge 
Ordonez’s alleged failure to investigate evidence of collusion between 
the plaintiffs and Cabrera, the expert who estimated up to $27 billion in 
damages.203 
Judge Nicolás Zambrano, the third judge, presided over the final 
phases of this case and rendered the $18 billion verdict on February 14, 
2011. The judgment includes $5.39 billion to restore polluted soil, $1.4 
billion to create a health system for the community, $800 million to treat 
people affected by the pollution, $600 million to restore polluted water 
sources, $200 million to help native species recover, $150 million to 
supply water to the community from unpolluted sources, and $100 
million to create a community cultural reconstruction program.204 It also 
includes $8.6 billion in punitive damages and an award of $860 million 
to the plaintiffs.205 A Chevron spokesman denounced the judgment as 
“illegitimate,” “unenforceable,” “the product of fraud,” and “contrary to 
the legitimate scientific evidence.”206 
                                                     
199. Mercedes Alvaro & Angel Gonzalez, Judge in Chevron Dispute Says Video Doctored, 
WALL STREET J., Sept. 2, 2009, at B6, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125186165368578445.html. 
200. Mercedes Alvaro, Judge in Chevron Case Agrees to Step Aside, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2009, 
at B5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125208172990086901.html. 
201. Alexandra Valencia, Ecuador Disbars Judge Who Heard Chevron Case, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2815738920101029. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Isabel Ordonez, A Breakdown of the $8.6 Billion Chevron Judgment, WALL STREET J. LAW 
BLOG (Feb. 14, 2011, 4:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/02/14/a-breakdown-of-the-8-
billion-chevron-judgment. 
205. See BILLENNESS & LEWIS, supra note 169. 
206. Press Release, Chevron Corp., Illegitimate Judgment Against Chevron in Ecuador Lawsuit, 
Chevron to appeal in Ecuador, enforcement blocked by U.S. and international tribunals (Feb. 14, 
2011), 
http://www.chevron.com/chevron/pressreleases/article/02142011_illegitimatejudgmentagainstchevr
oninecuadorlawsuit.news; see also Record Judgment I, supra note 168; Record Judgment II, supra 
note 168. 
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5.  Chevron’s Efforts to Block Enforcement of the Ecuadoran 
Judgment 
Six days before the Ecuadoran court issued its judgment, Chevron 
won a temporary restraining order from a federal district court in New 
York prospectively blocking enforcement in any court in the world of 
any judgment related to the case.207 The order is premised on Chevron’s 
allegations that the plaintiffs and their lawyers are engaged in a 
racketeering conspiracy to shake down the company.208 At a hearing in 
New York on February 8, 2011, Chevron alleged that lawyers and 
plaintiffs’ experts had doctored evidence.209 
Ironically, Texaco could have had the lawsuit decided by courts in the 
United States during the early 1990s, but it was the company that 
insisted that Ecuador was a more convenient forum.210 The federal court 
in New York dismissed the case on the condition that the company 
accept the jurisdiction of the Ecuadoran courts.211 After a change of 
government, Ecuador did not become the friendly forum Chevron had 
anticipated.212 
The editors of the Wall Street Journal denounced the litigation against 
Chevron in an editorial entitled “Shakedown in Ecuador.”213 The 
editorial declared that the “Ecuador suit is a form of global forum 
shopping, with U.S. trial lawyers and NGOs trying to hold American 
companies hostage in the world’s least accountable and transparent legal 
systems.”214 The Journal editors have thrice before denounced the 
lawsuit,215 but what proves their “forum shopping” claim to be 
                                                     
207. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
208. See id. at 627, 634; Amended Complaint at 1, Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 1:11-cv-00691-
LAK, (S.D.N.Y. April 20, 2011), 2011 WL 1805313; Editorial, Shakedown in Ecuador, WALL ST. 
J., Feb. 16, 2011, at A16, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703652104576121941625806096.html. 
209. See Michael D. Goldhaber, Chevron Wins TRO Barring Ecuadorian Plaintiffs and Their 
Lawyers From Attempting to Enforce Ecuadorian Judgment, AM. LAW. (Feb. 10, 2011), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202481024550. 
210. Kimerling, supra note 153, at  484. 
211. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d as modified, 303 
F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 478 (2d Cir. 2002). 
212. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also In re application of Chevron, 
709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 288–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 
297 (2d Cir. 2011). 
213. Shakedown in Ecuador, supra note 208, at A16. 
214. Id. 
215. Shakedown in the Rain Forest: The attempt to loot Chevron for $27 billion is falling apart, 
WALL ST. J., Sep. 23, 2010, at A22, available at 
 
WLR_October_Percival_FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/21/2011  1:19 PM 
614 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:579 
 
astonishingly false is the fact that the plaintiffs wanted the lawsuit 
litigated in New York federal court in 1993, but the case was dismissed 
in favor of the Ecuador forum at Chevron’s behest in 2002.216 
The judgment of the court in Ecuador may spur legal battles in even 
more countries as the parties fight over its enforceability wherever 
Chevron has assets. Chevron’s strategy of expanding the litigation to 
other courts and to the Permanent Court of Arbitration may have been an 
effort in part to exhaust the plaintiff’s resources. But, because of the 
amount of money at stake—prior to the issuance of the judgment in 
Ecuador, Morgan Stanley predicted that Chevron ultimately would have 
to settle the case for between $2 and 3 billion217—hedge funds stepped 
in and provided extra money to the plaintiffs who have now been able to 
hire a major Washington law firm to assist with the growing litigation.218 
On March 7, 2011, Chevron obtained a preliminary injunction from 
the federal district judge in New York hearing Chevron’s RICO 
litigation that barred the plaintiffs and their lawyers from seeking to 
enforce the $18 billion judgment. Judge Lewis A. Kaplan ruled that 
there was “ample evidence of fraud in the Ecuadorian proceedings”219 
and “abundant evidence . . . that Ecuador has not provided impartial 
tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of law.”220 He cited 
a report from a legal expert commissioned by Chevron that stated the 
judiciary in Ecuador is subject to political pressure from the government 
                                                     
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703625304575115831733424838.html; Bret 
Stephens, Amazonian Swindle, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2007, at A18; see Ben Casselman, Chevron 
Accuses Ecuador Plaintiffs, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 2011, at B3; see also Ben Casselman, Chevron 
Seeks to Turn Tables in Ecuador Case, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2011, 7:04 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704358704576118694226628616.html. This 
coverage has not escaped Chevron’s notice. Ecuador Lawsuit - News Coverage, CHEVRON, 
http://www.chevron.com/ecuador/newscoverage/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2011) (compiling Chevron-
friendly articles). 
216. Robert V. Percival, Letter to the Editor, Texaco Asked for Ecuadorian Venue, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 22, 2011, at A14, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704900004576152370171056008.html. 
217. Hugh Bronstein, Chevron Case Keeps Ecuador Judge Up Late, REUTERS, Feb 1, 2011, 
http://in.reuters.com/article/idINN3124172720110131 (estimating that this figure is “about half of 
the company’s most recent quarterly profit”). 
218. Rosario Gabino, ¿Como Pagan Los Ecuatorianos el Juicio Contra Chevron?, BBC MUNDO 
(Feb. 18, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/noticias/2011/02/110218_ecuador_chevron_financiamiento_rg.shtml; 
see also Scott Tong, A Long, Long Legal Bet, MARKETPLACE (Feb. 15, 2011), 
http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/web/2011/02/15/pm-a-long-long-legal-bet; Record 
Judgment I, supra note 168, at A1; Record Judgment II, supra note 168. 
219. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
220. Id. at 633. 
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and that Ecuador ranks among the lowest nations in assessments of the 
strength of the rule of law.221 Luis Gallegos, Ecuador’s ambassador to 
the United States, defended the country’s judicial system and expressed 
“consternation that a U.S. court has elected to pass judgment on 
Ecuador’s courts.”222 On September 19, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit vacated Judge Kaplan’s injunction while refusing 
the plaintiffs’ request to remove him from the case.223 
Regardless of which side ultimately prevails on appeal, the litigation 
will have a profound effect on transnational environmental litigation. 
First, it may make multinational companies more reluctant to seek 
dismissal of litigation on forum non conveniens grounds if the result is 
submitting to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. It also may generate 
pressure for countries to refine their standards for enforcing foreign 
judgments.224 Finally, because Chevron no longer has assets in Ecuador, 
the battle over enforcement of the Ecuadoran judgment against it will 
                                                     
221. Id. at 634–35. 
222. Lawrence Hurley, Ecuador’s U.S. Ambassador Speaks Out on Chevron Case, N.Y. TIMES 
GREEN (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/03/10/10greenwire-ecuadors-us-
ambassador-speaks-out-on-chevron-c-86771.html. 
223. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, Nos. 11-1150-cv(L), 11-1264-cv(con), 11-2259-op(con), 2011 
WL 4375022, at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2011). 
224. The United States is not a party to any international treaties on the reciprocal recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments. These matters are largely governed by state law, including the 
UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 Pt. II U.L.A. 39 (2002), which has 
been adopted by more than thirty U.S. states and territories, and general principles of comity. Mark 
Moedritzer, Kay C. Whittaker & Ariel Ye, Judgments ‘Made in China’ But Enforceable in the 
United States?: Obtaining Recognition and Enforcement in the United States of Monetary 
Judgments Entered in China Against U.S. Companies Doing Business Abroad, 44 INT’L LAW. 817, 
819 (2010). For a final foreign judgment to be enforced in the United States, the foreign court must 
have been an impartial tribunal using principles that afford due process of law with personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant and subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy. Id. at 822. 
One federal law that specifically addresses enforcement of foreign judgments was signed into law 
by President Obama in August 2010—the Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established 
Constitutional Heritage Act (SPEECH Act), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 4101–4105 (West Supp. 2011). The 
SPEECH Act, which was inspired by New York’s 2008 Libel Terrorism Protection Act, makes libel 
judgments against U.S. writers obtained in foreign countries unenforceable in U.S. courts if they 
involve speech protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Andrew Albanese, 
Obama Signs ‘Libel Tourism’ Law, PUBLISHERS WKLY. (Aug. 12, 2010), 
http://www.publishersweekly.com/pw/by-topic/industry-news/publisher-news/article/44148-obama-
signs-libel-tourism-law.html. The SPEECH Act is designed to deter “libel tourists” from seeking to 
use British courts where there are far more limited free speech protections to obtain judgments 
against U.S. writers for acts that would not be deemed libelous under U.S. law. The law is expected 
to increase pressure on Britain to revise its libel laws. Alex Spillious, US Outlaws ‘Libel Tourists’ 
Who Turn to Britain, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 29, 2010, at 16; Alex Spillious, US Law to 
Counter ‘Libel Tourism’ in British Courts, THE TELEGRAPH (July 28, 2010, 8:00 PM), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/7915063/US-law-to-counter-libel-
tourism-in-British-courts.html. 
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continue in foreign courts, principally in the United States; as these 
courts continue to wrestle with the question of whether Ecuador’s 
judicial system is entitled to respect, they may help shape global norms 
of due process. This in turn may influence the development of global 
law and how courts in other countries conduct themselves in their future 
proceedings. 
C.  Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corporation 
The Chevron litigation is not the only ongoing case involving harm 
allegedly caused in a foreign country by a U.S. oil company. In 2007, 
Amazon Watch,225 a U.S. environmental group, and twenty-five 
members of the Achuar indigenous group from the Rio Corrientes River 
region in Peru filed suit against Occidental Petroleum and its subsidiary, 
Occidental Peruana (OxyPeru) in Los Angeles Superior Court.226 From 
the early 1970s to 2000, OxyPeru operated an extensive oil extraction, 
processing, and distribution site known as “Block 1-AB” in an area that 
encompassed lands both within and upstream from Achuar 
communities.227 Occidental allegedly used methods of crude oil 
processing that it knew violated both U.S. and Peruvian law, releasing 
oil and its byproducts into area waterways.228 The plaintiffs alleged that 
these activities polluted the waters of the Rio Corrientes, causing harm 
to soil, fish, plants, and animals, and illness in the Achuar 
communities.229 Members of the Achuar community suffered from high 
blood levels of lead and cadmium, gastrointestinal problems, kidney 
trouble, skin rashes, and aches and pains.230 
Rather than bringing claims under the Alien Tort Statute, the 
plaintiffs raised common law tort claims including negligence, medical 
monitoring, and trespass.231 Occidental removed the suit to federal 
                                                     
225. Amazon Watch took part in the suit after traveling to the region and producing a 
documentary film about the pollution in the region. Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 643 
F.3d 1216, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011). The case was initially decided in December 2010, Carijano v. 
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 626 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2010), but the Ninth Circuit later withdrew 
this opinion and issued a new opinion in June of 2011. 
226. Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 548 F. Supp. 2d 823, 823 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
227. Id. at 826. 
228. Carijano, 643 F.3d at 1222. 
229. Carijano, 548 F. Supp. 2d at 826. 
230. Carijano, 643 F.3d at 1223.  
231. Carijano, 548 F. Supp. 2d at 826. The plaintiffs also alleged strict liability, battery, 
injunctive relief or damages in lieu of injunction, wrongful death, fraud, trespass, public nuisance, 
private nuisance, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of California’s Unfair 
Competition Law, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2008). 
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district court and successfully moved for dismissal on the basis of forum 
non conveniens, arguing that Peru is a more convenient forum.232 Under 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, the district court found that 
Occidental met its burden of proving that Peru was a suitable forum233 
and that the private interest factors234 and public interest factors235 were 
satisfied. Though there is a strong presumption in favor of a domestic 
plaintiff’s choice of forum under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 
the district court granted Occidental’s motion to dismiss.236 The district 
court reasoned that although Amazon Watch is a California plaintiff, the 
fact that the Achuar are foreign plaintiffs lessened the deference given to 
their choice of forum.237 
Plaintiffs appealed, and on December 6, 2010, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held: (1) 
Occidental did not meet its burden of proving that Peru is a more 
convenient forum; (2) the court gave insufficient weight to the 
presumption in favor of the domestic plaintiff’s choice of forum; and (3) 
the court abused its discretion in dismissing the lawsuit.238 The court 
found abuse of discretion because the trial court failed to place any 
mitigating conditions on its dismissal when it was justifiable to believe 
that Occidental would seek to dismiss the case under Peru’s statute of 
limitations.239 
                                                     
232. Carijano, 548 F. Supp. 2d at 835. 
233. Id. The court found that OxyPeru is subject to jurisdiction in Peruvian courts and adequate 
tort relief is available in this system. Id. at 828–29. The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that 
the Peruvian court system was “too corrupt” to provide adequate tort relief. Id. at 831.  
234. The private interest factors are: 
(1) the residence of the parties and witnesses; (2) the forum’s convenience to the litigants; (3) 
access to physical evidence and other sources of proof; (4) whether unwilling witnesses can be 
compelled to testify; (5) the cost of bringing witnesses to trial; (6) the enforceability of the 
judgment; and (7) “all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and 
inexpensive.” 
Id. at 832 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)). 
235. Id. at 833. These factors include “court congestion, local interest in resolving the 
controversy, and preference for having a forum apply a law with which it is familiar.” Id. 
236. Id. at 835. 
237. Id. at 834. 
238. Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 626 F.3d 1137, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010). On June 1, 
2011, the court withdrew its initial opinion and filed an amended opinion. Carijano v. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp., 643 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The new opinion reaches the same result, reversing 
the district court. 
239. Carijano, 643 F.3d at 1234. Plaintiffs had requested that the court apply the following 
conditions: “(1) any Peruvian judgment be satisfied; (2) Occidental waive any statute of limitations 
defense in Peru that would not be available in California; (3) Occidental agree to comply with 
United States discovery rules; and (4) Occidental translate documents from English to Spanish.” Id.  
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This case suggests that U.S. courts assessing claims of forum non 
conveniens are paying more attention to the consequences of such 
dismissals by considering the state of law in other countries. While no 
U.S. court has rendered a judgment holding a U.S. corporation liable for 
environmental harm caused abroad, lawsuits seeking relief for such harm 
have contributed to an ongoing global debate over what constitutes 
appropriate corporate behavior when companies from developed 
countries engage in resource extraction in the developing world.240 How 
these cases are resolved in the future will help shape developing norms 
of global environmental law. 
D.  Transnational DBCP Litigation 
Litigation brought by foreigners over exposure to a pesticide banned 
in the United States illustrates both the power and shortcomings of 
transnational tort litigation. In Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro,241 
banana workers in Costa Rica, who allegedly had become sterile, 
claimed that they had been injured by a pesticide (1,2-Dibromo-3-
Chloropropane, or DBCP) that the EPA had banned for use within the 
United States because of its reproductive toxicity.242 The workers 
brought a tort action in Texas state court against Dow Chemical, the 
U.S. company that continued to produce the pesticide solely for the 
export market, as permitted by U.S. law.243 After the trial court 
dismissed the action on forum non conveniens grounds, the plaintiffs 
appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.244 By a vote of five to four, the 
court held that the case must be heard in Texas because Texas law did 
not recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens.245 Shortly before 
the case was scheduled to go to trial in 1992, the eighty-two plaintiffs 
and their wives received a settlement worth nearly $20 million.246 
                                                     
240. See generally, e.g., LUKE DANIELSON, GLOBAL PUB. POLICY INST., ARCHITECTURE FOR 
CHANGE: AN ACCOUNT OF THE MINING, MINERALS AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 
(2006), http://www.sdsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Architecture-for-Change-
MMSD_Full_Report1.pdf (suggesting the development of environmental norms for extractive 
industries operating in developing countries). 
241. 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990). 
242. The pesticide DBCP to which the plaintiffs were exposed had been banned in the United 
States since 1977. The history behind this ban is told in DEVRA DAVIS, WHEN SMOKE RAN LIKE 
WATER 195–200 (2002). 
243. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2006). 
244. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 675. 
245. Id. at 679. 
246. Rick Kennedy, Fruit of the Poison Tree; In a Dallas Court, Costa Rican Banana Workers 
Claim a Banana Pesticide Left Them Sterile, DALLAS OBSERVER (Mar. 10, 2005), available at 
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Similar litigation against U.S. chemical companies by 13,000 banana 
workers in six countries was settled for more than $50 million.247 
DBCP litigation also has been brought in Nicaraguan courts, with 
successful plaintiffs relying on U.S. courts to enforce their claims. Under 
Special Law 364 enacted in 2001 to make it easier for plaintiffs to 
recover for exposure to DBCP, Nicaraguan courts awarded more than 
$2.1 billion in damages to plaintiffs.248 As described by Los Angeles 
Superior Court Judge Victoria Chaney, under this law “essentially 
anyone who obtains two required lab reports stating he is sterile and who 
claims to have been exposed to DBCP on a banana farm is entitled to 
damages; causation and liability are conclusively presumed.”249 Under 
special procedures prescribed by the law, the defendant must post a $15 
million bond and “has just 3 days to answer the complaint, the parties 
have 8 days to present evidence, and the court has 3 days to issue a 
judgment.”250 
The law made DBCP claims so attractive that widespread fraud 
occurred. Judge Chaney ultimately dismissed several DBCP lawsuits 
brought in Los Angeles Superior Court against the Dole Food Company 
because of fraud occurring in Nicaragua.251 The judge found the cases to 
be tainted by pervasive fraud by lawyers and others in Nicaragua who 
recruited plaintiffs who had never worked on banana plantations, 
falsified lab reports, and sought to intimidate witnesses who helped 
expose the fraud.252 Judge Chaney dismissed Tellez v. Dole,253 a 2007 
                                                     
http://www.dallasobserver.com/content/printVersion/285584. 
247. DAVIS, supra note 242, at 200. 
248. See Steve Stecklow, Fraud by Trial Lawyers Taints Wave of Pesticide Lawsuits, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 19, 2009, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125061508138340501.html 
(referencing a “legal system that heavily favored plaintiffs” in describing the $2.1 billion in 
judgments); Edvard Pettersson, Dole Doesn’t Have to Pay Nicaraguan Verdict, U.S. Judge Rules, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2009), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5nlMjavvtrM (referencing Special 
Law 364). 
249. Mejia v. Dole Food Co., No. BC340049, slip. op. at 23 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 17, 2009) 
(providing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting order terminating Mejia and 
Rivera cases for fraud on the court), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-Dole_Chaney_ruling.pdf. 
250. Id. 
251. Stecklow, supra note 248. 
252. Id. 
253. Press Release, Dole Food Co., Los Angeles Superior Court Vacates Judgment and Dismisses 
Fraudulent Lawsuit Brought by Nicaraguans Claiming to Have Been Banana Workers (July 15, 
2010), 
http://www.dole.com/CompanyInformation/PressReleases/PressReleaseDetails/tabid/1268/Default.a
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case, which awarded six plaintiffs $2.3 million for DBCP exposure.254 
The drama surrounding the case included accusations of witness 
tampering and threats against witnesses, which were believed to have 
originated in Nicaragua.255 Judge Chaney based her dismissal on the 
“fraudulent conduct by plaintiffs’ lawyers and their agents [which] led to 
Dole being unable to properly defend itself from the claims.”256 This 
case marked the final DBCP case brought in Los Angeles court by 
Nicaraguan plaintiffs against Dole.257 In light of Judge Chaney’s 
conclusions concerning pervasive fraud in Nicaragua, it is unlikely 
Nicaraguan DBCP judgments will be enforced by U.S. courts. However, 
Judge Chaney did specifically state that her conclusions only applied to 
cases involving Nicaraguan plaintiffs and that no evidence of fraud had 
been presented involving DBCP plaintiffs from any other country.258 
Like the Chevron litigation in Ecuador, the DBCP cases have 
spawned their own legal sparring over a pro-plaintiff documentary film 
called BANANAS!*.259 In 2009, Dole filed suit against the producers of 
the film arguing that it defamed the company.260 Four months after filing 
the defamation litigation, Dole agreed to drop the lawsuit.261 However, a 
Los Angeles court ordered the company to pay the defendants $200,000 
in legal fees pursuant to a California law designed to discourage SLAPP 
suits.262 
                                                     
spx?contentid=11722. 
254. Richard Clough, Dole Proposes New Settlements, L.A. BUS. J. (May 31, 2010), 
http://www.labusinessjournal.com/news/2010/may/31/dole-proposes-new-settlements/, available at 
2010 WLNR 12198414. 
255. Anthony McCartney, LA Judge in Banana Workers Case Cites Threats, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(June 7, 2010). 
256. Victoria Kim, Judge Cites Fraud, Throws Out Award to Dole Workers, L.A. TIMES, July 16, 
2010, at AA3 [hereinafter Judge Cites Fraud] (stating also that “massive fraud [had been] 
perpetrated on this court”); see also Victoria Kim, Judge Throws Out Verdict Awarding Millions To 
Dole Workers, L. A. TIMES (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter Judge Throws Out Verdict], 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jul/16/local/la-me-dole-20100716. 
257. Kim, Judge Cites Fraud, supra note 256, at AA3; Kim, Judge Throws Out Verdict, supra 
note 256. 
258. Mejia v. Dole Food Co., No. BC340049, slip. op. at 24 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 17, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-Dole_Chaney_ruling.pdf. 
259. Gina Keating, Dole Sues “Bananas” Documentary Maker, REUTERS (July, 8, 2009), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5677C520090708. 
260. Id. 
261. Deborah Crowe, Dole Drops Lawsuit Against Bananas! Filmmaker, L.A. BUS. J., Oct. 15, 
2009.  
262. Matthew Belloni, Dole Hit with $200,000 Penalty Over Movie Lawsuit, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/29/us-dole-idUSTRE6AS0S020101129. SLAPP 
suits are lawsuits brought to discourage members of the public from criticizing businesses, with 
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E.  The Trafigura Litigation 
One final example of transnational litigation is the Trafigura toxic 
waste disposal lawsuit, which demonstrates that even foreign 
corporations may not be able to conceal the environmental consequences 
of their activities in some remote corner of the world. As countries in the 
developed world began to regulate toxic waste disposal more stringently 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, often the developing world served as a 
dumping ground for toxic waste from industrialized countries. In August 
1986, the Khian Sea, a ship loaded with 15,000 tons of ash from 
incinerators in Philadelphia, sought to dump its cargo on a beach in the 
Bahamas but was turned away by Bahamian authorities.263 For the next 
sixteen months the ship sailed in search of a destination for its cargo, 
only to be turned away by six different countries. In January 1988, 3000 
tons of the ash were dumped in Haiti before the operation was 
stopped.264 The ship was then turned away from five more countries 
before the rest of the ash disappeared into the Indian Ocean somewhere 
between Singapore and Sri Lanka, after the ship had been renamed to 
conceal its identity.265 
When a ship named the Karin B, which was operated by an Italian 
company, dumped 8000 drums of toxic waste including PCBs in a 
Nigerian fishing village in 1988, Nigeria recalled its ambassador to Italy 
and forced the waste to be taken back to Italy.266 These and other 
incidents gave impetus to the adoption in 1989 of the Basel Convention 
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and 
their Disposal (“Convention”).267 While the Convention bans hazardous 
waste exports unless the government of the receiving country has 
                                                     
SLAPP standing for “Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation.” See generally GEORGE W. 
PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT 212–22 (1984) 
(discussing the authors’ study into 241 SLAPP cases). 
263. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 
1184 (6th ed. 2009). 
264. Id. 
265. Jerry Schwartz, The Trash that Wouldn’t Be Thrown Away, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 2, 
2000, available at Factiva, Doc. No. aprs000020010803dw930i2bu. 
266. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 263. 
267. U.N. Environment Programme Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Global Convention on 
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, Basel, Switz., Mar. 20–22, 1989, 
Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Global Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, Resolution 2, UNEP/IG.80/L.12, reprinted in 28 
I.L.M. 649, 656 (1989). 
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consented to receiving the waste,268 it does not establish any regime of 
liability for harm caused by waste dumping.269 
In August 2006, a ship operated by the British trading firm Trafigura 
dumped hundreds of tons of toxic waste in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, after 
failing in an effort to offload the waste in the Netherlands.270 Exposure 
to the waste allegedly resulted in some deaths and caused severe health 
problems in thousands of the people exposed to it.271 After the company 
reached a $198 million settlement with the government of Côte d’Ivoire 
for cleanup costs,272 a lawsuit was brought against it in London on behalf 
of 31,000 Côte d’Ivoire residents.273 The class action sought $160 
million in damages for health problems caused by exposure to the waste. 
Trafigura defended by blaming the waste dump on an “independent 
contractor.”274 It aggressively threatened to bring libel actions against 
media outlets that published reports favorable to the claimants.275 Yet 
when The Guardian revealed emails allegedly showing efforts by 
Trafigura to cover up its involvement in the waste dumping, Trafigura 
quickly announced in September 2009 that it had reached a £30 million 
settlement with attorneys for the plaintiffs.276 While attorneys for the 
plaintiffs expressed approval of the settlement, Greenpeace argued that 
                                                     
268. Id. at Art. 6, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. at 664 (setting out notification rules). 
269. Id. at Art. 12, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. at 668 (directing parties to adopt, “as soon as 
practicable, . . . rules and procedures in the field of liability . . . .”). 
270. David Leigh, Oil Trader Trafigura Faces Criminal Charges Over Attempt to Offload Toxic 
Waste in Netherlands, GUARDIAN, June 2, 2010, at 21 [hereinafter Oil Trader]; see also David 
Leigh, Trafigura Faces Criminal Charges Over Attempt to Offload Toxic Waste, GUARDIAN (June 
1, 2010, 8:09 PM) [hereinafter  Trafigura], http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/01/trafigura-
trial-toxic-waste-netherlands. 
271. David Leigh, Dirty Business – How UK Firm Covered Up Toxic Oil Disaster, GUARDIAN, 
Sept. 17. 2009, at 1 [hereinafter Oil Disaster]; see also David Leigh, How UK Oil Company 
Trafigura Tried to Cover Up African Pollution Disaster, GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2009, 10:08 PM) 
[hereinafter African Pollution], http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/16/trafigura-african-
pollution-disaster. 
272. The $198 million settlement Trafigura paid the Ivorian government in 2007 exempted the 
company from any legal proceedings in Côte d’Ivoire. Gilbert Kreijger, Dutch Court Fines 
Trafigura Over Ivory Coast Waste, REUTERS, July 23, 2010, 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE66M1SB20100723. Trafigura, however, denied any 
wrongdoing when it paid the settlement. Id. 
273. Editorial, Oil Waste Scandal: The Polluter Must Pay, GUARDIAN, Sept. 17, 2009, at 30, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/sep/17/compensation-trafigura-victory. 
274. Id. 
275. Oil Disaster, supra note 271, at 1; African Pollution, supra note 271. 
276. David Leigh, Greenpeace Continues Pursuit of Oil Trader Over Toxic Waste, GUARDIAN, 
Sept. 21, 2009, at 12, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/20/greenpeace-
trafigura-toxic-waste. 
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the company should still be prosecuted for manslaughter for deaths 
caused by the waste dumping.277 
Trafigura was criminally prosecuted in the Netherlands for the 
company’s actions in Amsterdam prior to the 2006 waste dumping in 
Abidjan. 278 Prosecutors charged that Trafigura attempted to dispose of 
waste cheaply in the Netherlands by concealing the toxicity of the waste 
in order to avoid specialized dumping procedures.279 Complaints from 
surrounding residents led Trafigura to pump the waste back on board the 
tanker after an initial attempt to dispose of it.280 The criminal 
prosecution in the Dutch court was brought against Trafigura, the 
Ukrainian captain of the tanker, which carried and disposed of the waste, 
and a London-based junior Trafigura employee. 281 All defendants were 
convicted, and the Dutch court fined the company €1 million for 
breaking European regulations on waste export to developing countries, 
harming the environment, and concealing “the harmful nature of the 
waste.”282 The court sentenced the Ukrainian tanker captain to a five-
month, suspended jail sentence for concealing the waste’s harmful 
nature and for forgery in reporting the waste to Dutch authorities.283 The 
junior Trafigura employee was sentenced to a six-month suspended jail 
sentence and a €25,000 fine for concealment of the waste’s harmful 
nature.284 However, the City of Amsterdam was acquitted; although the 
city oversees the port and had been charged with “leaving dangerous 
waste in the hands of someone not qualified to process it,”285 the court 
found that the port was acting as a public body and therefore immune 
from prosecution.286 Additional charges against Trafigura’s chief 
executive officer were dropped,287 although these charges may be re-
                                                     
277. Id. 
278. Oil Trader, supra note 270, at 21; Trafigura, supra note 270. 
279. Oil Trader, supra note 270, at 21; Trafigura, supra note 270. 
280. Oil Trader, supra note 270, at 21; Trafigura, supra note 270. 
281. See Oil Trader, supra note 270, at 21; Trafigura, supra note 270. 
282. Kreijger, supra note 272. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. 
285. See Oil Trader, supra note 270, at 21; Trafigura, supra note 270. 
286. Kreijger, supra note 272. 
287. See Oil Trader, supra note 270, at 21 (“It has been ruled that the company’s chief executive, 
Claude Dauphin, should not face personal charges.”); Trafigura, supra note 270 (same). But see 
Jurjen van de Pol, Trafigura CEO Ruling Should be Re-examined in Ivory Coast Case, Court Says, 
BLOOMBERG (July 6, 2010, 5:08 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-06/trafigura-ceo-
ruling-on-ivory-coast-must-be-reviewed-dutch-top-court-says.html (describing how the issue of 
whether Trafigura Beheer BV Chief Executive Officer Claude Dauphin also should be prosecuted 
was being reviewed by a Dutch court). 
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examined.288 Shortly after the Dutch court’s ruling, Trafigura indicated 
that it would “study the court’s findings with a view to appeal.”289 
Additionally, Trafigura maintained its employee’s innocence and stated 
it would continue to provide legal assistance to the employee.290 
The Trafigura litigation demonstrates that corporations based in the 
United States are not the only multinationals to be subject to 
transnational litigation as a result of their operations abroad. Companies 
with global operations no longer can be confident that they can conceal 
the environmental consequences of their activities in some remote corner 
of the world. Global networks of activists are now able to question 
corporate activities even in remote areas and to seek legal redress for 
environmental harm. Even if the lawsuits do not succeed, the harsh light 
of publicity may serve as a catalyst for changes in corporate behavior. 
For this reason, NGOs increasingly are turning to transparency and 
disclosure strategies, as discussed below. 
IV.  PRIVATE TRANSNATIONAL TRANSPARENCY 
INITIATIVES 
Private parties are now playing a major role in the emergence of 
global environmental law, which features “new actors, new institutions, 
and new rules” that are very different from international law’s traditional 
focus on relations between sovereign states.291 Among the most striking 
recent developments is the growth of private initiatives to promote 
increased transparency concerning the activities of multinational 
corporations and their environmental impacts. This Part discusses three 
such initiatives: (1) the Equator Principles that require environmental 
assessments for major development projects funded by multinational 
banks, (2) the Palm Oil Roundtable, and (3) efforts to “green the supply 
chains” of major corporations. 
                                                     
288. Kreijger, supra note 272. 
289. Probo Koala Updates, TRAFIGURA (July 23, 2010), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20100725164253/http://www.trafigura.com/our_news/probo_koala_upd
ates.aspx#nrN78o5pUE34 (accessed by searching 
“http://www.trafigura.com/our_news/probo_koala_updates.aspx” on the Internet Archive’s main 
page—http://www.archive.org—and selecting the snapshot from July 25, 2010). 
290. Id. 
291. This was noted a decade ago by Philippe Sands in his discussion of the evolution of 
international law in Turtles and Torturers: The Transformation of International Law, 33 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 527, 556 (2001). 
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A.  The Equator Principles 
On June 4, 2003, a group of large banks that finance major 
development projects announced the adoption of the Equator Principles. 
These principles commit the banks to follow common standards for 
assessing the environmental risks of the projects they fund and to require 
environmental management plans for controlling those risks. These 
standards are based on the practices of the World Bank’s International 
Finance Corporation. There are currently seventy Equator Principle 
Financial Institutions (EPFIs).292 These seventy EPFIs provide more than 
eighty percent of project financing in developing nations.293 
Because of the lack of transparency in both the Equator Principles and 
the banking industry, it is difficult to ascertain whether banks are only 
financing projects that are environmentally sound and rejecting the 
others.294 It is also difficult to determine whether banks are requiring 
projects to be amended before providing financing.295 The Equator 
Principles have no external mechanism for compliance or accountability, 
which leads many critics to believe that the Principles mean little.296 One 
method of addressing this concern is a new requirement that clients with 
projects that have significant environmental and social concerns create a 
grievance mechanism for the affected community to voice those 
concerns.297 “Informal regulators” (i.e., NGOs and civil society) are 
using the grievance mechanism, as well as public shame, to ensure that 
EPFIs comply with the Principles. 298 
One example of an NGO utilizing a grievance mechanism deals with 
the financing of the Finnish company Metsa-Botnia’s Orion paper-pulp 
                                                     
292. About the Equator Principles, EQUATOR PRINCIPLES ASS’N, http://www.equator-
principles.com/index.php/about-ep/about (last visited Sept. 6, 2011). 
293. Steven Ferrey, The Failure of International Global Warming Regulation to Promote Needed 
Renewable Energy, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 67, 113 (2010). 
294. Andrew Hardenbrook, Note, The Equator Principles: The Private Financial Sector’s 
Attempt at Environmental Responsibility, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 197, 227 (2007). 
295. Id. 
296. Natalie L. Bridgeman & David B. Hunter, Narrowing the Accountability Gap: Toward a 
New Foreign Investor Accountability Mechanism, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 187, 220–21 
(2008). 
297. Id. at 217. 
298. See id. at 219 (“For example, at an October 2007 seminar on sustainable finance sponsored 
by HSBC Mexico, UNEP Finance Initiative, and the Mexican Government’s National Ecological 
Institute, a presenter from ABN AMRO showed photos of protestors and NGO campaign ads in her 
presentation while making the point that ‘informal regulators’ . . . are requiring compliance with 
voluntary standards such as the Equator Principles.”). 
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mill in Uruguay.299 The Orion paper-pulp mill project in Uruguay was a 
significant project estimated to increase the GDP of Uruguay by two 
percent per year.300 Argentina, however, opposed the project, arguing 
that it would pollute the River Uruguay—shared by both countries—
while bringing no financial benefit to Argentina.301 The Centre for 
Human Rights and Environment (CEDHA) invoked the Equator 
Principles in its campaign to stop financing for the project.302 The 
CEDHA complaint stated that the project did not take into consideration 
serious harm to local communities and valuable natural resources.303 
While CEDHA was not able to stop the construction of the mill,304 it did 
succeed in convincing ING to withdraw from the $480 million project, 
shocking the project finance world.305 ING was known as a leading 
advocate for the Equator Principles, and many consider the negative 
publicity a major reason for the company’s decision to withdraw.306 
However, after ING withdrew, Calyon, another bank that had signed 
onto the Equator Principles, stepped in to finance the project.307 
B.  Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
Another important set of private initiatives have sought to reduce 
environmental destruction caused by palm oil production. In 2009, world 
vegetable oil production totaled about 150 million tons, approximately 
forty million of which were palm oil.308 Although palm oil is entirely 
                                                     
299. Vivian Lee, Note, Enforcing the Equator Principles: An NGO’s Principled Effort to Stop the 
Financing of a Paper Pulp Mill in Uruguay, 6 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 354, 359–61 (2008).  
300. U.S. Votes in Favor of Int’l Loan for Uruguay Pulpmill Project, U.S. FED. NEWS, Nov. 21, 
2006, available at 2006 WLNR 20482976. 
301. Lee, supra note 299, at 360. 
302. Id. 
303. Id. at 360–61. 
304. See id. at 361 (noting that the project has been in operation since September 11, 2007). 
305. Id. at 364; see also Letter from A. Cohen Stuart, ING Group, to J.D. Taillant, Ctr. for 
Human Rights & Env’t, (Apr. 12, 2006), available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20101202194025/http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/initiatives/paper_pulp_mil
ls/ing-pullout-letter-april-12-2006.pdf (accessed by searching 
“http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/initiatives/paper_pulp_mills/ing-pullout-letter-april-12-2006.pdf” on 
the Internet Archive’s main page—http://www.archive.org—and selecting the snapshot from Dec. 
2, 2010) (indicating ING’s pullout from the Metsa-Botnia project). 
306. “With or Without IFC Support”, Botnia’s Mill Goes Ahead, MERCOPRESS (June 14, 2006, 
9:00 PM), http://en.mercopress.com/2006/06/14/with-or-without-ifc-support-botnia-s-mill-goes-
ahead. 
307. Lee, supra note 299, at 364. 
308. Sustainable Palm Oil, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, 
http://www.rspo.org/?q=page/789 (last visited Sept. 6, 2011). 
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free of genetically modified (GM) plants and has the highest yield per 
hectare of any oil, its production has significant environmental 
consequences.309 Palm oil production destroys not only tropical forests, 
310 but also peatland, whose destruction emits large amounts of stored 
carbon dioxide.311 Palm oil is mainly produced in tropical areas of Asia, 
Africa, and South America, and its production has generated extreme 
deforestation in some areas.312 In May 2008, Unilever announced that it 
would use only palm oil that was certified as sustainable by 2015, and it 
would support the call for a moratorium for any further deforestation for 
palm oil in Indonesia.313 Palm oil can be used as biofuel, and many palm 
oil projects initially were funded as Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) projects and Joint Implementation (JI) projects pursuant to the 
Kyoto Protocol.314 However, companies in the European market have 
been turning away from funding these projects, due to their perceived 
environmental harm and their consequent reputational risk.315 
In 2001, the World Wildlife Foundation (WWF) began a dialogue to 
promote sustainable palm oil production.316 This interchange led to an 
informal discussion among Aarhus United UK Ltd., Gold Hope 
Plantations Berhad, Migros, Malaysian Palm Oil Association, 
Sainsbury’s, and Unilever in 2002.317 These organizations became the 
foundation for the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO).318 Over 
200 participants from sixteen countries attended the first official meeting 
of the RSPO, which took place in Malaysia in August 2003.319 The 
organizations adopted a Statement of Intent, a non-legally binding 
                                                     
309. Id. 
310. Id. 
311. Caitlin Randall, Carbon Market Takes Sides in Palm Oil Battle, CARBON FIN. (Nov. 20, 
2007), http://www.carbon-
financeonline.com/index.cfm?section=features&id=10864&action=view&return=home. 
312.  Sustainable Palm Oil, supra note 308. 
313. Letter from Gavin Neath, Senior Vice President, Unilever, to Marcel Silvius, Wetlands Int’l, 
available at 
http://wetlands.org/WatchRead/tabid/56/ArticleType/ArticleView/ArticleID/2145/PageID/1365/Def
ault.aspx (follow “Moratorium on deforestation on palm oil production” download hyperlink; then 
open “Unilever letter”) (last visited Oct. 18, 2011). 
314. Randall, supra note 311. 
315. Id. 
316. History, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, http://www.rspo.org/?q=page/10 (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2011). 
317. Id. 
318. Id. 
319. Id. 
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expression of support for the RSPO.320 The RSPO was formally 
established on April 8, 2004 under Article 60 of the Swiss Civil Code.321 
Currently, there are 416 members, 85 affiliate members, and 36 supply 
chain associates.322 Members are expected to develop and implement 
plans of action within the framework of the Roundtable to promote 
sustainable palm oil production, procurement, and consumption, as well 
as to act transparently and regularly inform the RSPO of plans to 
promote sustainable palm oil production, procurement, and 
consumption.323 
While the RSPO is helping to reduce the environmental impact of 
palm oil production, severe deforestation problems remain.324 A report 
from Wetlands International states that deforestation from palm oil 
production is worse than previously expected.325 Between 2005 and 
2010, about one-third (almost 353,000 hectares) of Malaysia’s total peat 
swamps were cleared on the island of Borneo alone, according to the 
report.326 Deforestation is significantly worse than the government 
claimed.327 The total 510,000 hectares of peat swamps cleared in 
Malaysia in this time period is conservatively estimated to have released 
twenty million tons of carbon dioxide annually.328 While many palm oil 
firms in the area are under pressure from the RSPO to produce 
sustainably, many palm oil producers have avoided doing so due to the 
strong palm oil demand from India and China.329 The Wetlands 
International report calls for an end to incentives for biofuels production 
in the European Union because it can increase demand for palm oil crops 
and contribute to deforestation.330 
                                                     
320. Id. 
321. Id. 
322. Who is RSPO?, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, http://www.rspo.org/?q=page/9 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2011). 
323. RSPO Statutes, By-Laws and Code of Conduct: Art. 4.3, ROUNDTABLE ON SUSTAINABLE 
PALM OIL, http://www.rspo.org/?q=page/896 (last visited Sept. 6, 2011). 
324. Tom Young, Report Targets Carbon Impact of Malaysian Palm Oil, BUSINESSGREEN (Feb. 
2, 2011), http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2023434/report-targets-carbon-impact-malaysian-
palm-oil. 
325. Id. 
326. Press Release, Wetlands Int’l, New Figures: Palm Oil Destroys Malaysia’s Peatswamp 
Forests Faster than Ever (Feb. 1, 2011), 
http://www.wetlands.org/NewsandEvents/NewsPressreleases/tabid/60/articleType/ArticleView/artic
leId/2583/Default.aspx. 
327. Id. 
328. Id. 
329. Young, supra note 324. 
330. Id. 
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Other private initiatives have sought to pressure companies and 
organizations to reduce their use of non-sustainable palm oil. In 
November 2007, Greenpeace published a report stating that major 
companies, including Nestlé, Cargill, and Unilever, were contributing to 
global warming through the use of non-sustainable palm oil.331 In 
addition, in May 2011, two teenagers received national publicity for 
their campaign to convince Girl Scouts of the USA to remove palm oil 
from Girl Scout cookies.332 After major environmental groups endorsed 
their crusade,333 the teenagers met with officials of the national 
organization who promised to look for substitutes for palm oil in their 
cookies.334 
C.  NGO-Private Partnerships and Efforts to Promote “Green Supply 
Chains” 
A final example of an important private initiative is the formation of 
environmentally conscious NGO-private partnerships. Companies that 
adhere to high environmental standards while operating in the developed 
world often are not as scrupulous in seeking to protect workers or the 
environment when operating in developing countries. Some corporations 
claim to be unaware of, or unable to prevent all, environmental or 
worker safety problems in the companies that are part of their supply 
chain.335 In recent years NGOs have worked to highlight these problems 
in an effort to encourage companies to green their supply chains.336 
These efforts have the potential to improve environmental and working 
conditions in developed countries even when regulatory standards do not 
require such improvements. 
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In January 2011, a coalition of thirty-four Chinese environmental 
protection organizations led by the Beijing-based Institute of Public and 
Environmental Affairs released a report assessing the environmental 
health and safety records of Chinese companies that supply twenty-nine 
multinational technology companies.337 Of the twenty-nine companies, 
Apple’s suppliers placed last because of industrial pollution and 
exposure of workers to health risks.338 In response, Apple released its 
own Apple Supplier Responsibility Progress Report339 shortly before its 
annual meeting with shareholders. The company disclosed that its own 
audit of its suppliers had found instances of unsafe working conditions, 
improper handling of toxic chemicals, and the use of underage labor by 
some of its suppliers in China.340 
In March 2011, a group of clothing manufacturers, retailers, and 
environmental groups announced the formation of the Sustainable 
Apparel Coalition that will assess the environmental impact of every 
element of apparel production in order to provide consumers with 
“sustainability scores” for each product.341 The thirty founding members 
of the coalition include major retailers such as Wal-Mart and J.C. Penny, 
the Environmental Defense Fund, and the EPA.342 Chairman of the new 
coalition is the famous former mountain climber Rick Ridgeway, who 
runs Patagonia’s sustainability efforts.343 The initial focus of the 
Coalition will be to assist companies in greening their supply chains.344 
Some large retailers, such as Wal-Mart, have pioneered their own 
form of “retail regulation” by refusing to carry products that do not meet 
various environmental criteria, for example, products that may contain 
certain toxic substances.345 But the latest initiatives go a significant step 
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further by requiring companies to make affirmative inquiries concerning 
conditions at their suppliers in developing countries. 
Private and NGO efforts to encourage companies to research their 
suppliers more carefully should be bolstered by provisions in the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank 
Act).346 Section 1502 of the Dodd–Frank Act added a subsection to the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) regarding conflict 
minerals.347 The new provision requires disclosure to the Securities 
Exchange Commission (SEC) of whether minerals used by companies 
originated in the Democratic Republic of Congo or an adjoining 
country.348 On December 15, 2010, the SEC proposed regulations 
regarding conflict mineral disclosures.349 The four primary metals 
covered by the legislation that are widely used by electronics 
manufacturers are tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold.350 It is hoped that 
these regulations will help mobilize companies to pay more attention to 
the sources of the raw materials they use.351 The complexity of the 
reporting will depend on the length of the chain-of-custody, or the 
number of times the minerals exchange hands from extraction to 
production.352 
There have been varying reactions to the proposed regulations.353 The 
electronics industry, which has dealt with conflict minerals issues for 
several years,354 has been supportive. Hewlett-Packard, for example, 
posted a letter of support, stating that this provision will provide much-
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needed transparency in companies’ supply chains and reduce the use of 
conflict minerals.355 Jewelers, however, have not been as enthusiastic.356 
Patrick Dorsey, general counsel of Tiffany & Company, wrote a letter to 
the SEC in September 2010, stating that the increasing use of recycled 
metal by gold smelters makes tracing the origin of much of the gold 
nearly impossible.357 Dorsey urged the SEC to define gold as a conflict 
mineral only when there was reason to suspect that it might have 
originated in the Democratic Republic of Congo or a neighboring 
country.358 Others are criticizing the proposed regulations by arguing 
that they are a departure from the SEC’s mission of protecting investors 
and ensuring market integrity and that they inject foreign policy into 
federal securities regulation.359 
Section 1504 of the Dodd–Frank Act requires companies in extractive 
industries to disclose to the SEC payments made to foreign governments 
for the purpose of commercial development of oil, natural gas, or 
minerals. This provision is designed to help make it harder for corrupt 
foreign government officials to seek bribes because they would have to 
be publicly disclosed by the company paying them. The Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA),360 which prohibits bribery of foreign officials by 
companies traded on U.S. stock exchanges,361 has been a major force in 
spreading respect for the rule of law in developing countries.362 
Enforcement of the FCPA makes it easier for companies to resist 
solicitations for bribes and spreads respect for legal norms throughout 
the supply chain of multinational enterprises. The transparency 
provisions in the Dodd–Frank Act are likely to bolster efforts by NGOs 
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and private companies to green supply chains and to spread respect for 
legal norms such as the FCPA’s prohibition on bribery. 
CONCLUSION 
Globalization is having a profound impact on legal systems 
throughout the world. International law traditionally focused primarily 
on relations between states, but relations between states and private 
multinational enterprises are becoming of central importance in a 
globalized world. In an effort to more effectively control risks generated 
by multinational enterprises, countries are borrowing regulatory 
innovations from one another at a rapid rate and increasing efforts to 
coordinate regulatory policy. Distinctions between domestic and 
international law and between private and public law are diminishing in 
force. The traditional “top-down” approach of negotiating multilateral 
international agreements is giving way to a variety of “bottom-up” 
initiatives that often involve greater participation by NGOs. The result is 
the emergence of global law, which is not a set of globally harmonized 
regulatory standards, but rather a term to describe the more complex set 
of phenomena that are occurring in several fields of law, particularly 
environmental law. 
This Article explored various aspects of the emergence of global 
environmental law and the changing path by which global environmental 
norms are emerging. Even as efforts to achieve global consensus on a 
successor to the Kyoto Protocol have faltered, regional responses to 
climate change are alive and well. For example, regional and other 
efforts to control air pollution from ships are progressing, and the 
movement to ban the remaining uses of asbestos and leaded gasoline has 
made global strides. 
In response to perceived harm caused by the operations of 
multinational corporations, plaintiffs are bringing transnational liability 
litigation in both their own countries and in countries where such 
corporations are headquartered. Liability awards, such as an Ecuadoran 
court’s $18 billion judgment against the Chevron Corporation for oil 
pollution in Ecuador, may speed the development of reciprocity norms 
for transnational enforcement of environmental judgments. Even when 
transnational litigation fails in court, it can shine a global spotlight on 
environmentally destructive practices that companies would be wise to 
abandon. 
Finally, transparency initiatives promoted by coalitions of NGOs and 
corporations also are a new and vibrant part of the complex architecture 
of global environmental law. In an interconnected world of multinational 
enterprises, companies no longer can claim ignorance of, or inability to 
affect, occupational and environmental conditions in their supply chains 
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even in remote parts of the world. Transparency works precisely because 
of the emergence of global environmental norms; previously tolerated 
risks, such as exposing the residents of developing countries to toxic 
waste, are no longer tolerated in the developed world. In the emerging 
world of global environmental law, the golden rule is extending its reach 
to every corner of the planet. 
 
